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Hundreds of thousands of lives have been saved by
vehicle safety standards. 2
For many years, the auto
industry fought the adoption of even the most basic
standards tooth and nail, arguing that driver responsibility
was the key to preventing auto accidents. 3 In doing so,
2

See, e.g., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REP. NO. DOT

HS 809 833, LIVES SAVED BY THE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
STANDARDS AND OTHER VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES, 1960-2002 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS - WITH A REVIEW OF 19 FMVSS AND
THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN REDUCING FATALITIES, INJURIES AND CRASHES

(2004) (finding that from 1968-2002 nearly 253,000 avoidable deaths in
the United States were attributable to a defined subset of federal
vehicle safety standards).
3
Matthew T. Lee, The Ford Pinto Case and the Development of
Auto Safety Regulations, 1893-1978, 27 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 390, 394-95
(1998), available at http://www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHprint/
v027n2/p0390-p0401.pdf ("Although the auto industry did little to
encourage public discussion of auto safety issues, it was instrumental in
framing this debate.

. .

. [T]he industry 'owned' the power to define the

problem of auto safety and fixed political responsibility for deaths on
driver behavior and road design rather than car design. . . . The
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vehicle manufacturers "reinforceled] certain common sense
ideas about traffic safety"-that drivers were responsible for
car accidents and that vehicle design could not do much to
make serious crashes survivable-"and suppressled]
others."4 Auto insurers-who bear much of the economic
cost of car crashes through a combination of first party and
liability insurance-initially joined auto manufacturers in
pushing driver education and traffic safety laws over vehicle
design
standards.
Eventually,
however,
injury
epidemiologists convinced the insurers that improved
vehicle design promised greater safety gains and cost
savings and thus drove a wedge between insurers and
manufacturers.5 Ultimately, the auto insurance industry
played a crucial role in turning the tide against motor
vehicle injuries by funding research to develop vehicle
safety standards and lobbying to make them law.6 Thirdparty payers have powerful incentives to reduce the costs
associated with illness, injury, and property damage. They
also have powerful influence on policymakers with regard to
the law and policy strategies adopted for reducing those
costs.
industry's actions .

.

. effectively marginalized safety critics concerned

with vehicle design."), archivedat http://perma.cclZ4ES-5323.
4
Id. at 395.
5 MARTIN ALBAUM, SAFETY SELLS: MARKET FORCES AND
REGULATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRBAGS 18 (2005), available at
http://safetysells.org/contents.html (describing a shift in the auto
insurance industry toward seeing "federal auto safety regulation as one
way of stemming the inflation in insurance premiums" and a "move
away from [insurers'] traditional reluctance to challenge the automotive
establishment").
6
About the Institutes, HIGHWAY SAFETY RESEARCH & COMMC'NS,
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/about-us
(describing the history of the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and injury prevention
epidemiologist William Haddon's instrumental role in transforming it
into an independent research organization pioneering the use of
scientific methods to develop and test interventions to reduce "crash
losses" rather than simply preventing crashes by altering driver
behavior); DAVID HEMENWAY, WHILE WE WERE SLEEPING: SUCCESS
STORIES IN INJURY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION 9-19 (2009) (describing
the role of auto insurance companies in supporting injury prevention
research and policy change).
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In the health insurance context, underappreciated
provisions in the Affordable Care Act ("ACA")7 encourage
third-party payers-employers, private health insurers, and
public Medicaid programs-to take a more active role in
reducing health care costs by conditioning the terms of
coverage on individuals' compliance with recommended
health behaviors aimed at preventing heart disease, stroke,
and cancer. Champions of this approach, which I call
"personal responsibility for wellness," argue that it could
help halt rising health care costs and turn the tide against
some of the most pressing public health problems of our
Employers exhibit enormous enthusiasm for
time.8
programs that condition financial rewards and penalties
(typically in the form of premium discounts or surcharges or
differential cost-sharing through deductibles, co-pays, and
co-insurance) on individual participation in wellness
programs ranging from health screenings to weight loss
counseling.9 The proportion of employers offering incentivebased programs has increased dramatically over the past
few years. 10 An annual survey of employers with 1000 or
more employees indicates that in 2014 nearly 70% of them
7 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010).
8 See, e.g., Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness
Programs Can Generate Savings, 29 HEALTH AFF. 304 (2010) (metaanalysis concluding that workplace wellness programs improve health
outcomes and reduce health care costs). Chronic conditions (including
chronic pain and mental health disorders as well as heart disease,
stroke, and cancer) account for about 75% of health-care costs in the
United States. See CTRs. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, THE
POWER TO PREVENT, THE CALL TO CONTROL: AT A GLANCE 2 (2009),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/chroniedisease/resources/publications/
aag/pdf/chronic.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/S8W8-Z2TC.
The prevalence of wellness programs and their design features
9
(including among smaller employers) are discussed further in Part II.A,

infra.
10 See TOWERS WATSON/NATIONAL BUSINESS GROUP ON HEALTH, 2014
EMPLOYER SURVEY ON PURCHASING VALUE IN HEALTH CARE (2014),
availableathttp://www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/IC-Types/SurveyResearch-Results/2014/03/towers-watson-nbgh-employer-survey-onpurchasing-value-in-health-care. [hereinafter 'TOWERS WATSON SURVEY"],
archivedathttp://perma.cc/XK68-FT5L?type-pdf.
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offered healthy behavior incentives." Many employers are
shifting away from incentives for participation alone toward
incentives tied to the maintenance of particular health
metrics or the attainment of particular results in a defined
time period. As of 2014, 42% had adopted incentives tied
directly to smoking status with an additional 16% planning
to do so in 2015.12 Twenty-two percent used incentives tied
to biometrics like weight and cholesterol, with an additional
24% reporting that they planned to do so in 2015.13 At the
same time, Medicaid programs in politically conservative
states have been experimenting with applying the corporate
wellness program model to their Medicaid populations, with
mixed results. 14
Critics of incentive-based personal responsibility for
wellness programs are concerned that these programs may
simply shift health care costs from third-party payers to
individuals without resulting in better health outcomes.15
Given that there is often a lapse of decades between
behaviors like tobacco use, unhealthy eating, or physical
inactivity and the health care costs associated with them, 16
11 Id. at 23.
12
Id. at 22.
13

Id.

See Karen J. Blumenthal et al., MedicaidIncentive Programsto
Encourage Healthy Behavior Show Mixed Results to Date and Should
14

be Studied and Improved, 32 HEALTH AFF. 497, 499 (2013).
The
prevalence and design of Medicaid personal responsibility for wellness
reforms is discussed further in Part II.E, infra.
15
John DiNardo et. al., Toward a Scientific Approach to Workplace
Wellness: A Response to Ron Goetzel, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (July 1,
2013),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/07/0 1/toward-a-scientificapproach-to-workplace-wellness-a-response-to-ron-goetzell, archived at
http://perma.cc/Z2EX-D87W.
16 See, e.g., William Weiss, Cigarette Smoking and Lung Cancer

Trends:A Light at the End of the Tunnel., 111 CHEST 1414, 1416 (1997)
(suggesting "an average latency interval between onset of smoking and
lung cancer diagnosis of close to 50 years"), available at
http://journal.publications.chestnet.org/data/Journals/CHEST/21747/141
4.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S3X7-WXGV; J.G. Eriksson et. al.,

Catch-up Growth in Childhood and Death From Coronary Heart
Disease:LongitudinalStudy, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 427 (1999), available at
http://www.ncbi.n1m.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC27731/pdf/427.pdf
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and given that Americans frequently move from one form of
health care coverage to another over the course of a
lifetime,' 7 third-party payers' interests may not be entirely
Personal
well aligned with sound prevention policy.
responsibility for wellness reforms aims to incentivize
individual behavior change without necessarily facilitating
it through environmental changes. By creating conditions
hostile to those who are unhealthy (or are perceived as
unhealthy due to their weight or other factors), reforms
have the potential to encourage "lemon dropping" by driving
from wellness-oriented
away
employees
unhealthy
employers while directly shifting costs to those who remain,
in the form of higher premiums, co-pays and co-insurance.
This approach threatens to undermine the ACA's broader
goal of promoting access to health care without regard to
health status or risk factors.
Elsewhere, I have argued that personal responsibility
reforms reflect cultural biases that exaggerate the extent to
which ill health is attributable to the personal failings of
unhealthy individuals and that they serve as a political
distraction from less punitive measures aimed at making
our communities, workplaces, schools, and marketplaces

(linking death from heart disease in later adulthood to prenatal and
childhood nutrition); 011i T. Raitakari et al., Associations Between

Physical Activity and Risk Factors for Coronary Heart Disease: the
CardiovascularRisk in Young Finns Study, 29 MED. & SCl. SPORTS &
EXERCISE 1055 (1997), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/9268963 (associating physical activity in childhood and young
adulthood with blood cholesterol levels and risk of premature coronary
heart disease during middle age).
17
Erika C. Ziller et. al., Patternsof Individual Health Insurance
Coverage, 1996-2000, 23 HEALTH AFF. 6, 210 (2004), available at
(describing
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/23/6/210.full#R14
high volatility in enrollment and disenrolment in the individual
insurance market); ROBERT SEIFERT & AMANDA LITTELL-CLARK, MASS.
MEDICAID POL'Y INST., ENROLLMENT VOLATILITY IN MASSHEALTH: A
at
available
(2013),
REPORT
PROGRESS
http://bluecrossmafoundation.org/sites/default/files/download/publication/
high
(describing
EnrollmentVolatilityinMassHealthFINAL.pdf
enrollment).
volatility in state Medicaid
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more conducive to healthy living.18 Here, I assess ongoing
agency implementation of the ACA's personal responsibility
for wellness reforms and find cause for hope.
This Article describes and assesses ongoing federal
agency implementation of ACA personal responsibility for
wellness provisions, including the 2013 Workplace Wellness
Programs Study; the 2013 Incentives for Nondiscriminatory
Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans Final Rule; the
Individual Insurance Wellness Program Demonstration
Project; the Small Business Workplace Wellness Grant
Program; and the Medicaid Incentives for Prevention of
Chronic Diseases Grant Program. The Article proceeds in
Part I by situating the personal responsibility for wellness
approach within the broader federal health law and policy
landscape. In Part II, I describe the personal responsibility
for wellness provisions included in the ACA and the current
state of agency implementation with regard to each. I argue
that in implementing these provisions, the Department of
Health and Human Services ("DHHS") appears to be taking
an appropriately skeptical stance toward personal
responsibility for wellness measures that use rewards and
penalties to encourage, but not necessarily facilitate,
healthier behavior.
I conclude by arguing that recent
agency actions are a step in the right direction, but
continued vigilance is necessary to ensure that third-party
payers do not use wellness reforms to undermine the ACA's
goals with respect to health care access and disease
prevention. I also suggest that public health advocates
should continue to seek the support of third-party payers in
their efforts to transform our workplaces, communities,
schools, and marketplaces to make them more conducive to
healthy living.

18

Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of

Obesity Control, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 121 (2013) [hereinafter Wiley,
Shame].
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I. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR WELLNESS IN THE FEDERAL
HEALTH LAW LANDSCAPE
After a hard fought political battle, followed by Supreme
Court litigation that left its own marks, the United States
health care system is in the midst of a challenging
We are shifting toward a far more
transformation.
collective approach to health care financing, while
maintaining the basic configuration of our fragmentary
health care delivery and financing system. The ACA is
expanding Medicaid eligibility beyond the specific categories
covered under previous law.19 In states that choose to
accept the expansion (the Supreme Court's ruling made it
truly optional20), all individuals living below 138% of the
federal poverty level are now eligible, including childless,
non-disabled adults.2 1 The Health Insurance Portability
and Affordability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") and the ACA
sharply restrict the ability of private health insurance plans
to manage and segment risk through individually-focused
underwriting. 22 To make these reforms more feasible and
palatable for insurers, the ACA mandates the purchase of
private insurance for virtually all individuals who can
afford it and who are not otherwise covered. 23 The threat of
a tax penalty 24 and the availability of financial assistance
25
for lower- and middle-class individuals and familieS
encourage healthy people to purchase insurance now, rather

1s

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,

§ 2001, 124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010).
20 Constance Macintosh, The Role of Law in Ameliorating Global
Inequalities in Indigenous Peoples' Health, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 77

(2013).

21 Sidney D. Watson, EmbracingJustice Roberts' 'New Medicaid"
6 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 247 (2013).
22 See infra Part I.A.1.
23 26
U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (the minimum essential coverage
requirement).
24
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) (the shared responsibility payment).
25
26 U.S.C. § 36B (premium assistance tax credits); 42 U.S.C. §
reduction payments).
(cost-sharing
18071
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than waiting to take advantage of the guaranteed issue 26
and community rating27 protections. Taken together, these
reforms effectively subsidize intensive health care
consumers at the expense of healthier, less intensive health
care consumers, while also protecting those who are
perceived as likely to become intensive health care
consumers in the future. 28
Along with increased public responsibility for health care
financing comes renewed interest in public responsibility for
"upstream" prevention of disease and injury as a strategy
for reducing health care costs and improving the public's
health and wellbeing. Justice Scalia famously warned that
if the government can force people to buy health insurance,
there is nothing to stop it from forcing them to buy broccoli
as well. 2 9 So far, no one has seriously proposed an "eat your
vegetables" mandate, but state and local governments are
pursuing a wide range of strategies to make healthy choices
easier
and
unhealthy
choices
harder,
including
subsidization of fresh produce, taxation of harmful products,
zoning and licensing rules aimed at shifting the balance
between healthy and unhealthy retail food establishments,
and rules governing portion sizes.30 The ACA itself includes
26 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (guaranteed issue and renewability
requirements for health plans).
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-4 (restricting discriminatory premium
rates and prohibiting other forms of discrimination based on health
status).
28 Subsidy of the unhealthy by the healthy is a feature of every
health care system in the world. The means by which that subsidy is
achieved are simply more or less hidden. The ACA makes subsidies
more visible, but they were always there, including in the form of
padded prices charged to patients with private insurance and out-ofpocket payers to help cover the costs of uncompensated care provided
(often inefficiently through the emergency room) to the uninsured.
29 James B. Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme CourtMenu,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/business/
how-broccoli-became-a-symbol-in-the-health-care-debate.html?-r=0,

archivedathttp://perma.cc/V4QQ-EDY9.
so

See Lindsay F. Wiley, Manel Kappagoda & Anne Pearson,

Public Health Law. Non-Communicable Disease Prevention, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAw (Glenn Gohen et al. eds.)
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a federal excise tax on tanning bed services, 31 a calorie
labeling mandate for restaurant menu items, 32 regulations
to facilitate breastfeeding, 33 and grants to fund other
community-level prevention strategies. 34
Within the context of this broad movement toward
greater collective responsibility for health, there is
considerable push-back. "Personalresponsibility" for health
(and financial security, education, and many other aspects
of life) has long been a conservative mantra.35 It is also
used quite cynically-and successfully-by industries that
market harmful products (guns, unsafe vehicles, tobacco,
alcohol, fast food, and sugary drinks) in their efforts to
avoid regulation. 36 More recently, it is being used by thirdparty payers to blunt the impact of health care reform. Less
well-known provisions of the ACA promote personal
responsibility for wellness through regulatory exceptions
and grant programs aimed at employers, private health
Through these
plans, and state Medicaid programs.
provisions, "the health reform law pays obeisance to the
notion that individuals bear responsibility for their own
health but can be guided through a system of rewards and
penalties to make the 'right' choices." 37

(forthcoming 2014) (describing the public health law toolkit for
influencing health behaviors through environmental changes).
31 26 U.S.C. § 5000B (10% excise tax on tanning bed services).
32 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (requiring restaurants to disclose
calorie counts on menus).
33 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (requiring employers to provide adequate
break time and facilities for nursing mothers).
34 42 USC § 300u-13 (community transformation grants).
35 See Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who's Your Nanny? Choice,

Paternalismand Public Health in the Age of PersonalResponsibility, 41
J.L. MED. & ETHICS S88 (2013).
36 Id. at S89.
37 Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Weighing Status:
Obesity, Class,and Health Reform, 89 OR. L. REV. 1113, 1134 (2011).
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A. PersonalResponsibilityfor Wellness: Conditioning
FinancialIncentives on Medical Compliance, Lifestyle
Compliance,and Biometrics
The ACA personal responsibility for wellness provisions
were adopted at a time of surging scientific and political
interest in the use of financial incentives to encourage
healthier behaviors. Personal responsibility incentives can
be aimed at influencing "medical compliance" behaviors,
such as reporting on time for scheduled medical
appointments, taking medications as prescribed, and
submitting to recommended vaccinations and screening
tests. 38 They can also be aimed at influencing "lifestyle
compliance"-including behaviors like tobacco use, diet, and
exercise. More controversially, incentives can be tied to the
achievement or maintenance of biometrics (such as weight,
body mass index, blood pressure, cholesterol, or blood
glucose) within specified ranges. This approach effectively
treats an individual's health status as a proxy for behavior
or lifestyle choices. 39
38

See SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS
STUDY: FINAL REPORT xiii (2013) [hereinafter RAND REPORT], available

at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/
RR254/RANDRR254.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y6QM-T26E.
39 Although healthier eating and physical activity are
recommended to prevent and manage obesity, high blood pressure, high
cholesterol, and high blood glucose, the characterization of these
biometrics as the product of lifestyle choices alone is far from accurate.
See, e.g., J.J. Hottenga et. al., Heritability and Stability of Resting
Blood Pressure,8 TWIN RES. HUM. GENETICS 499 (2005) (reviewing twin
studies and finding that between 34% and 67% of variation in blood
pressure from person to person is explained by genetic factors); Cathy

Elks, Variabilityin the Heritabilityof Body Mass Index: A Systematic
Review and Meta-regression,14 OBESITY REvs. 872 (2013) (reviewing
twin studies finding between 47% and 90% of variation in adult body
mass index from person to person is explained by genetic factors);
Daphna Weissglas-Volkov & Pdivi Pajukanta, Genetic Causes of High
and Low Serum HDL-Cholesterol,51 J. LIPID RES. 2032 (2010) (noting
estimates that between 40% and 60% of variation in HDL cholesterol
from person to person is explained by genetic factors), available at
http://www.jlr.org/content/51/8/2032; Annemarie Simonis-Bik et al.,

Heritability of HbAlc and Fasting Blood Glucose in Different
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rewarded
have
approaches
experimental
Some
compliance with small, one-time incentives: a few dollars, a
voucher or gift card, or participation in lotteries for the
same. Studies suggest that these approaches work best
when targeted at compliance with a simple requirement
(such as showing up for the third shot in a series of
vaccinations, taking a dose of tuberculosis medication under
observation, or reporting for a post-natal doctor's
appointment), but are considerably less effective at inducing
more complex forms of compliance (such as eating a healthy
diet, engaging in physical activity on a regular basis, or
quitting smoking).40 Other experimental approaches have
rewarded compliance with larger financial rewards that are
doled out more gradually. But even long-term programs
with incremental incentives have thus far been associated
with only small and temporary effects on weight or smoking
cessation. 41 Participants who lose weight tend to regain the
weight (and then some).42 And former smokers who quit

Measurement Settings, 11 TWIN RES. HUM. GENETICS 567 (2008) (twin
study finding that 75% of variation in glycated hemoglobin from person
to person is explained by genetic factors).
40
See RAND Report, supra note 38, at 76, 92; Adam Oliver &

Lawrence D. Brown, Politics of Prevention:A Consideration of User
FinancialIncentives to Address Health Inequalities,37 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 201 (2012).
41 See Jill R. Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in the Workplace:
Cost Savings Through Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH
AFF. 468, 471(2013) ("Four comprehensive weight loss reviews show
little significant loss-particularly over longer periods of time, such as
twelve months. For example, a review of long-term, multicomponent
weight management programs identified twelve trials, four of which
The review's conclusion: Incentive-based
included incentives.
loss, but participants tended to regain
weight
promoted
interventions
the weight.").
Id. at 471 ("A meta-analysis of seven trials with follow-up
42
periods of at least twelve months found that financial incentives were
associated with a weighted mean loss of 0.88 pound at twelve months
and 1.5 pounds at eighteen months, and a weighted mean gain of 2.42
pounds at thirty months, although none of the results were
[statistically] significant.").
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after receiving incentives are more likely to relapse than

those who quit without incentives. 43
The terms on which health care coverage is provided are
complex and multi-faceted, creating numerous opportunities
for the application of small, one-time incentives as well as
larger, long-term rewards aimed at medical and lifestyle
compliance, as well as maintenance or achievement of
particular biometrics. Encouraged by federal regulatory
exemptions, waivers, and funding, third-party payers are
experimenting with the use of premiums, deductibles, copays, co-insurance, provider networks, and benefits to
create incentives for various forms of compliance. In Part
II, I will describe current federal programs in detail.
B. Types of Health-careCoverage and FederalRegulation to
EnsureAccess
To appreciate how the ACA personal responsibility for
wellness provisions operate, one must understand the basics
of how people get health-care coverage and how each type of
coverage is regulated at the federal level to promote more
universal health-care access. Before I turn to detailed
description of the ACA's personal responsibility for wellness
provisions, I need to describe the general types of healthcare coverage affected by these provisions-private group
health plans, private individual-market health insurance,
and Medicaid-and the basic contours of access-focused
regulation with respect to each. This section provides
general background that readers familiar with HIPAA's
portability provisions, the ACA's private insurance reforms,
and federal Medicaid law may wish to skip.

Id. at 471 ("In one study, all participants received $45 for each
interview and blood draw (up to a total of $180), and incentive group
members received $750 for smoking cessation, confirmed by cotinine
testing-that is, testing for a chemical found in cigarette smoke. After
six months, 9.4% of the incentive group remained non-smoking,
compared to 3.6% of the control group. However, relapse rates six
months after the incentives ended were significantly higher for the
incentive group.").
43
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1. PrivateHealth Insurance
The majority of Americans under age sixty-five are
covered by private health plans. 44 Federal (and state)
regulation of private health care coverage is organized
around the three main segments of the private marketlarge-group, small-group and individual/non-group plansbased on the unique market forces affecting each. Most
private health insurance is offered as a benefit of
employment. 45 Most of these plans cover large groups,
allowing them to reduce actuarial risk by pooling large
numbers of employees, which makes medical losses more
predictable. 46 Small employers are less likely to offer health
insurance, though many do in spite of the higher per-worker
costs. 47
These small-group plans are more expensive
because smaller groups have less bargaining power, higher
per-worker overhead costs, and smaller risk pools. 4 8 Both
large-group and small-group plans benefit from the "healthy
worker" effect (for a variety of reasons, people who work
generally have lower health-care costs than those who do
not).49 Individual, or "non-group" health plans that are not
tied to employment make up a very small segment of the
market.50 The individual market is an important one,
however, because it is the only option for individuals who do
not have insurance through their employment and do not
44

Health Insurance Coverage for Adults 19-64, HENRY J. KAISER

FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/adults-19-64/
Apr. 24, 2014).

(last visited

45

Id.

46

Consumer Guide to Group Health Insurance, NAT'L Ass'N OF

UNDERWRITERS,
http://www.nahu.org/consumer/
GroupInsurance.cfm (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter CGGHI],
archivedat http://perma.cc/3C8L-XK2B.
47
See Paul B Ginsburg et al., TrackingSmall-firm Coverage, 19891996, 17 HEALTH AFF. 167 (1998).
48
CGGHI, supranote 46.
HEALTH

4
See, e.g., A.J. McMichael, Standardized Mortality Ratios and
the "Healthy Worker Effect":' Scratching Beneath the Surface, 18 J.

OCCUPATIONAL MED. 165 (1976).
50
DELOITTE, THE IMPACT OF HEALTH REFORM ON THE ON THE
INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKET: A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT (2011).
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qualify for public programs like Medicare and Medicaid. 5 1
It is also a particularly problematic market because less
healthy individuals (who anticipate that they will need to
consume a lot of health care) tend to be overrepresented in
the individual market and individual market insurers are
unable to spread actuarial risk across the healthier, larger
pools that employment-based plans enjoy. 52
Unlike home, auto, or life insurers, health plans are
prohibited from engaging in the most basic forms of riskbased underwriting. 53 The main tools employed by insurers
to differentiate and manage risks (denying coverage to highrisk applicants, charging them higher premiums, and
imposing less favorable cost-sharing or coverage exclusions
on them) are now prohibited or greatly restricted by federal
law. The ACA's "guaranteed issue" provision requires that
private health insurers offer coverage to all comers,
regardless of health status or related factors. 54 "Community
rating" provisions in the ACA sharply limit insurers' ability
to manage financial risk by charging higher rates to
individuals who are likely to have greater health-care
5
And bans on exclusions for treatment of preneeds.@
existing conditions mean that insurers must cover
conditions that are present at the time of enrollment even if
they are certain to result in extensive payment of benefits
by the insurer.5 6 For large employment-based group plans,
larger risk pools and the healthy worker phenomenon make
guaranteed issue and community rating quite feasible.
Indeed, most group plans already followed these practices
before they were required to do so by the Health Insurance

51 Id.
52 Id.

53 Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What's Insurance Got to Do
with It. 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 436 (2010).
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (guaranteed issue and renewability).
55

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(b) (prohibiting discriminatory premium

rates).
56 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-3 (prohibiting pre-existing conditions
exclusionary clauses and other forms of discrimination based on health
status).
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Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA").57 But
the ACA's extension of these regulations to the individual
market in 2014 and its expanded ban on pre-existing
conditions exclusions for all plans pose new challenges.
Particularly in light of their reduced ability to manage
risk using the tools of traditional insurance, private
employers (whether large or small) and private insurers are
highly motivated to reduce health-care costs through other
means. On average, employers who offer health insurance
coverage as a benefit of employment pay about $11,000 per
year for family coverage and $4500 per year for single
coverage.5 8 Insurers are under pressure from consumers to
keep premium increases to a minimum even as health-care
costs continue to rise at a rate that far outstrips regular
inflation.
Premium increases in the small-group and
individual markets are monitored by federal and state
regulators.59 Large hikes are also routinely reported on by
the media-generating bad press for health plans and
"Obamacare" reforms alike.
2. PublicPrograms
Nearly one-quarter of the U.S. population is covered by
Medicaid or the Children's Health Insurance Program
("CHIP"), a federally block-granted adjunct to Medicaid. 60
57
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub.
L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
58
See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC.
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: ANNUAL SURVEY 64 (2011),
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/8225.pdf.
59
See, e.g., 42 USC § 300gg-94 (2014) (providing for premium rate
reviews); National Conference of State Legislatures, State Approval of
Health Insurance Rate Increases, http://www.ncsl.org/researchlhealth/
(last
updated
health-insurance-rate-approval-disapproval.aspx
February 2014) (surveying state laws regarding rate increase review
and approval), archivedat http://perma.cc/4FBY-CPTS?type=image.

60

Medicaid Enrollment as a Percent of Total Population, 2010,

J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/stateMedicaid
(indicating
indicator/medicaid-enrollment-as-a-of-pop/
enrollment as of 2010 as 21% of the total U.S. population); DIANE
ROWLAND ET AL., MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMM'N,
HENRY
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Unlike Medicare (a program for the elderly and disabled
that is entirely federally run),61 Medicaid is funded and
administered jointly by the federal government and the
states. As such, it is governed by relatively broad federal
guidelines that give states considerable leeway to determine
the exact contours of eligibility and benefits. 62 Even greater
flexibility is afforded through a waiver process whereby a
state may petition the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services to waive particular regulations as part of a
research or demonstration project. Section 1115 of the
Social Security Act gives the HHS Secretary authority to
waive regulations with respect to approved experimental,
pilot, or demonstration projects.63 With a section 1115
waiver, a state may develop and implement new approaches
to coverage that would otherwise by prohibited under
federal law. These demonstration projects are typically
approved for a five-year term, renewable for an additional
three years.
Demonstration projects must be budgetneutral with regard to federal expenditures,6 4 but federal
grant programs occasionally make additional funds
available to test new approaches.
The states have an enormous interest in controlling
health-care costs associated with their Medicaid programs.
Medicaid spending accounted for nearly one-quarter of all

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 5 (2013), available at
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a-v&pid=sites&srcid=bWFjcGFjLmdvdn
xtYWNwYWN8Z3g6NWE3MTM2NWU4NjhhNDVmYQ
(providing
enrollment numbers for 2013 that equate to 23% of the total U.S.
population).
61 Medicare has not been the focus of ACA personal responsibility
for wellness provisions and thus is not discussed further in this article.
62
Nicole Huberfeld, FederalizingMedicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
431, 447-48 (2011)
63
Id.
64 Section 1115 Demonstrations,MEDIcAID.Gov, http://www.medicaid.
gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/Section1115-Demonstrations.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/9NV4-C8U6.
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state expenditures in 2013.65 Smoking among Medicaid
recipients is 53% more prevalent than among the
population as a whole, 66 and annual medical costs for
smokers are significantly higher than those for nonsmokers.67 Although information about diabetes prevalence
among the Medicaid population is not available, 68
commentators have suggested that "[t]he high prevalence of
diabetes among minority populations coupled with the high
percentage of minority Medicaid beneficiaries suggests that
a disproportionate number of Medicaid beneficiaries suffer
from diabetes."69 And diabetes is a very expensive disease
to manage. 70 Given what is known about the strong links
between many health problems and poverty,'7 1 it seems
65 NAT'L AsS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE
REPORT 2 (2013), available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/
files/State%20Expenditure%2OReport%20%28Fiscal%202011-2013&20
Data%29.pdf, archivedathttp://perma.cc/E4MW-JPDH.
66 Brian S. Armour et al., State-Level Medicaid Expenditures
Attributable to Smoking, 6 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE A84, A84
(2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/pcdlissues/2009/jul/08_0153.htm,
archivedat http://perma.cc/9482-B2EB.
67

Maggie Fox, Smoking Employees Cost $6,000 A Year More, Study

Finds,NBC NEWS (June 3, 2013, 6:55 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/
smoking-employees-cost-6-000-year-more-study-finds-6C10182631,
athttp://perma.ce/A7SA-7GUX?type-image.
68

archived

See, e.g., Diabetes Medicare Beneficiaries (Percent), HEALTH

http://healthindicators.gov/Indicators/
INDICATORS
WAREHOUSE,
(last
Diabetes-Medicare-beneficiaries-percent_294/Profile/ClassicData
visited Apr. 24, 2014) (reporting that more than one-quarter of Medicare
beneficiaries have diabetes, but lacking similar information regarding
Medicaid beneficiaries), archivedat http://perma.cc/4EH6-TYBP.
69 HEALTH STRATEGY CONSULTANCY & DUKE UNIV. FUQUA SCH. OF
BUS., MEDICAID COST CONTAINMENT AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON
available
at
1,
6
(2003),
DIABETIC
BENEFICIARIES
http://www.avalerehealth.net/research/docs/HSCDiabetesWhitePape
r_20031021.pdf.
70 Xiaohui Zhuo et al., Lifetime Direct Medical Costs of Treating

Type 2 Diabetes and Diabetic Complications, 45 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE
MED. 253 (reporting that diabetics face medication costs up to $600
annually, in addition to approximately $500 in physicians visits, and
$100-$300 in self-testing devices), available at http://www.ajpmonline.
org/article/SO749-3797(13)00338-3/fulltext.
71 Alyssa Brown, With Poverty Comes Depression,More Than Other
Ilnesses, GALLUP (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/pol/158417/
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likely that the Medicaid population is generally sicker than
the non-Medicaid population.

II. THE ACA's PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
WELLNESS PROVISIONS
The ACA promotes personal responsibility for wellness
through five main provisions targeting each of the types of
health-care coverage described above. First, the statute
mandated that the Secretaries of Health and Human
Services, Labor, and Treasury report to Congress on the
effectiveness and impact of the workplace wellness
programs that are becoming a common feature of largegroup health plans. Second, although the ACA generally
prohibits private health plans from discriminating on the
basis of health factors, a "wellness program" exception
allows group health plans to adopt incentives and penalties
tied to the terms of coverage as part of a program of health
promotion and disease prevention.
Third, the statute
directed DHHS to establish a demonstration project
whereby individual-market health plans are permitted to
adopt wellness programs. Fourth, the ACA authorized a
program to subsidize the creation of new workplace
wellness programs by small businesses. Fifth, the ACA
mandated a grant program for state Medicaid programs
experimenting with the use of incentives aimed at chronic
disease prevention. In this part, I will examine agency
implementation with regard to each of these provisions.
Although the statute itself provides fairly detailed
parameters for each of these provisions, federal agencies
retain significant flexibility to resolve and clarify statutory
ambiguities. As described below, agencies appear to be
resolving statutory ambiguities in ways that minimize the
poverty-comes-depression-illness.aspx?utm source=alert&utmmedium=
email&utmcampaign=syndication&utmcontent=morelink&utmterm=AlI
%20Gallup%20Headlines (finding that more than 30% of people living in
poverty have been diagnosed with depression at some point, compared to
only 16% of people not living in poverty), archived at http://perma.cc/3R79SXPF.
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impact of the personal responsibility for wellness provisions
while reinforcing the ACA's broader goals of health care
access and disease prevention.

A. The 2013 RAND Report on Workplace Wellness
Programs
In May 2013 (possibly timed to coincide with the
promulgation of the wellness program rule discussed below),
the non-profit RAND Corporation released a study on
workplace wellness programs sponsored by DHHS and the
The study satisfied an ACA
Department of Labor.72
mandate that the Departments report to Congress on the
effectiveness of wellness programs and their impact on
of coverage.7 3
affordability
and
care
to
access
Unsurprisingly, the findings of the RAND study did not
fully support the hyperbolic 2010 congressional testimony of
Safeway executives and others about the benefits of
workplace wellness programs. 74 As described in detail
below, the study found that while workplace wellness
programs are quite popular with employers, their impact on
health-care costs and health outcomes is limited. The
RAND survey data and qualitative analysis of five
anonymous employer case studies also provide a useful
overview of how typical workplace wellness programs
operate.

72

73

RAND REPORT, supra note 38.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2801-1 (2014). The wellness program exception

to non-discrimination provisions in the ACA and the Health Insurance
Portability and Affordability Act of 1996 is implemented jointly by
DHHS and the Department of Labor.

See David S. Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims about Safeway
Wellness Incentives Shape Health-Care Bill, WASH. POST (Jan. 17,
74

2
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 010/01/
("In a legislative debate filled with
15/AR2010011503319.html
myth about Safeway, which has become
the
rival
misconceptions, few
that big employers and insurers
provision
a
for
the poster company
shows how the untested claims of
story
chain's
covet. The supermarket
their own and shape national
of
life
a
on
interest groups can take
policy."), archivedat http://perma.cc/3FK8-M5MF.
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1. The Prevalenceand Design of Workplace Wellness
Programs
Approximately half of U.S. employers with fifty or more
employees report that they offer wellness programs.75
These programs cover nearly 80% of employees working for
firms with fifty or more employees. 76 Among employers who
report that they do not currently offer a wellness program,
more than a quarter express that they are considering
offering one in the near future.77
Employers typically
combine multiple program components with various
features. How wellness programs are regulated depends
heavily upon the classification of each program component
based on its design features. For this reason, it is worth
parsing the RAND Report survey data regarding the
prevalence of various design features in some detail.
Some workplace wellness program components, which I
will refer to as "employer responsibility" programs, are
aimed at making the worksite a healthier environment in
ways that "make the healthy choice the easy choice"7 8 for
employees. For example, half of all employers with fifty or
more employees report that they offer on-site flu vaccination
services. 79 Forty percent say they offer free or subsidized
gym memberships or on-site facilities.80
And some
employers have taken steps to ensure the availability of
healthy food and beverage options in their cafeterias,
vending machines, or at meetings.8 ' For example, one of the
five anonymous case study employers described in the
RAND study (RAND Employer B) reports that it
coordinates with a local farmer to sell fresh produce to

75 See RAND Report, supra note 38, at 18. As noted in the
introduction, the proportion is significantly higher among employers
with 1000 or more employees.
76 Id. at 19.

77
78
79

80
81

Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 22.
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employees once per week and offers a healthy, low-cost
lunch special in the cafeteria. 82
Most wellness programs, however, include one or more
components that place the onus on individual employees to
change their behaviors. 83 I will refer to these generally as
"personal responsibility" programs, and will further
categorize them into distinct sub-types (see Table 1). These
programs typically employ financial rewards or penaltieS84
82

Id.

Id. at 25 (reporting that 72% of employer wellness programs
include a combination of screening and interventions focused on
behavior change).
In general, I treat rewards and penalties as interchangeable.
84
See FAMILIES USA, WELLNESS PROGRAMS: EVALUATING THE PROMISES
AND PITFALLS 3-4 (2012) ("The difference between a reward and a
penalty in a wellness program can be illusory, because a wellness
program reward can result in the exact same negative financial effect on
workers as a penalty. To understand this, let's imagine a scenario: An
employer decides to offer its workers a wellness program in conjunction
with health coverage and wants to vary workers' premiums based on
whether they participate in a health assessment and five health
coaching classes. . .. The employer can achieve this by implementing
83

either a reward or a penalty program. Option 1: .

.

. The employer sets

all employees' premium contributions at $200 a month. If workers do
not complete the wellness program, they have to pay a premium
surcharge of $50 a month.

. .

. Option 2: The employer sets all workers'

premium contributions at $250 a month, and workers who participate in
the wellness program receive a $50 per month discount on their
premiums as a reward. ... In both Option 1 and Option 2, workers who
cannot participate in the wellness program end up paying $250 a month
in premiums, which is $50 more than the workers who do participate."),
available at http://familiesusa.org/sites/default/files/productdocuments/
Wellness-Programs.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7LSS-PHWK. The
2013 Rule explicitly treats penalties and rewards as interchangeable.
See 29 C.F.R. § 2990.702(f)(1)(i) ("Except where expressly provided
otherwise, references in this section to an individual obtaining a reward
include both obtaining a reward (such as a discount or rebate of a
premium or contribution, a waiver of all or part of a cost-sharing
mechanism, an additional benefit, or any financial or other incentive)
and avoiding a penalty (such as the absence of a premium surcharge or
other financial or nonfinancial disincentive). References in this section
to a plan providing a reward include both providing a reward (such as a
discount or rebate of a premium or contribution, a waiver of all or part
of a cost-sharing mechanism, an additional benefit, or any financial or
other incentive) and imposing a penalty (such as a surcharge or other
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to prompt individual compliance with desired behaviors.85

They generally begin with a screening component to identify
at-risk individuals (often with a financial reward to
encourage participation in the screening process). Many
employers couple that screening component with an
intervention component aimed at urging individuals to
change their behavior. In many cases, the employer offers a
financial award to those who participate in the intervention
component, without regard to results. In some cases, the
employer offers a financial reward conditioned upon
attainment of particular results (such as a 5% weight loss).
Other programs offer a financial award tied directly to the
maintenance or achievement of biomarkers within a certain
range (such as blood cholesterol levels or a body mass index
within a defined range) or to the absence of certain risk
factors (such as tobacco use).
Personal responsibility
programs might include some aspects that make behavior
change easier, for example by hosting health screenings or
behavior change programming on-site for employees'
convenience, but the primary focus is on encouraging
employees (and in some cases their dependents)86 to take
responsibility for their own health.
Individuals who currently have or are at increased risk
for disease are identified through screening. About 80% of
employers that offer wellness programs include some kind
financial or nonfinancial disincentive)."). The 2006 Rule also treated
rewards and penalties as interchangeable. 29 C.F.R. §2590.702(f)(2)(i)
(superseded) ("A reward can be in the form of a discount or rebate of a
premium or contribution, a waiver of premium or contribution, a waiver
of all or part of a cost-sharing mechanism (such as deductibles,
copayments, or coinsurance), the absence of a surcharge,or the value of
a benefit that would otherwise not be provided under the plan.")
(emphasis added).
85
Of the 51% of employers in the RAND survey that have
instituted workplace wellness programs, nearly 70% have adopted some
kind of financial incentive. Id. at 70.
86 The RAND Report did not focus on this issue, but annual
surveys of employers with 1000 or more employees conducted by Towers
Watson indicate that about 40% of very large employers extended
financial incentives for wellness to covered spouses in 2014, up from
34% in 2013. See TOWERS WATSON SURVEY, supranote 10, at 23.
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of screening component. 87 Of those, about 38% conduct
their screening programs solely through Health Risk
Assessments ("HRAs"),88 which typically take the form of a
questionnaire to collect self-reported information about risk
factors and behaviors, including nutrition, physical activity,
89
More
smoking, weight, blood pressure, and cholesterol.
than two-thirds of employers that offer wellness programs
use clinical tests that collect biometric data, such as height,
weight, blood pressure, blood glucose, and cholesterol, either
These clinical
alone or in combination with HRAs.90
Some
screenings can be conducted on-site or off-site.
while
only,
employees
employers conduct screenings for
others also screen family members covered by the employerbased health plan.
Some incentive-based wellness programs offer rewards
for completion of screening assessments or tests, with no
further action required based on the results. The health
plan might offer incentives like cash payments or prizes
For
unrelated to the terms of health-plan coverage.
for
$50
offers
it
that
example, RAND Employer C reports
completion of an online health assessment and $20 for
completion of biometric screening. 9 ' Or they might tie the
financial incentive directly to the terms of health-plan
coverage. 92 For example, RAND Employer D reports that it
offers up to a $2600 premium differential to employees who
93
complete health screenings, regardless of the results.
RAND Employer B reports that as part of a one-time pilot
program, it offered a $15 reduction in co-payments for the

87

Id. at 27.

8s

Id.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 27.
91 Id. at 71. Forty-seven percent of employers with wellness
programs offer merchandise or gift cards, and 21% offer cash. Id. at 72.
92 Thirty-eight percent of employers who offer wellness program
incentives use discounts or surcharges to alter the cost of health
insurance premiums, while about 3% alter the terms of cost-sharing
arrangements (such as co-pays) as an incentive. Id. at 72.
93 Id. at 71.
89
90
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year as a reward to employees who completed an on-site
health screening. 94
Prior to the implementation of non-discrimination
provisions in HIPAA (for group plans) and the ACA (for all
plans, including insurers in the individual market), these
same kinds of screenings were typically conducted by health
insurers as part of the application and underwriting
process.95 In contrast, workplace wellness screenings may
not be used to deny coverage to particular employees or
their dependents. 96 Screening test results may, however, be
used by employers and group health plans to impose
premium discounts or surcharges based on test results or to
direct particular individuals to intervention programs. Even
for programs that do not include an interventional
component, the hope is that giving individuals information
about their risk factors might prompt them to alter their
behavior.
Personal responsibility interventions may be focused on
medical compliance (more than half of employers that have
established wellness programs include disease management
interventions aimed at promoting adherence to prescribed
treatment regimens97) or lifestyle compliance (about 77% of
employers offering a wellness program report that they offer
lifestyle interventions98).
Among employers offering
interventions aimed at promoting lifestyle compliance,
nearly 80% offer nutrition or weight-loss programs,
including on-site Weight WatchersTM group meetings,
weight-loss competitions, or individualized counseling
provided by outside vendors. 99 About the same proportion
offer smoking-cessation programs of a similar nature, and

94
95

Id.

Id.
As described in Part II.B.1, infra, HIPAA prohibited group
health plans from discriminating on the basis of health status for the
purposes of eligibility.
97 Id. at 22.
96

98

Id. at 21.

99

Id.

INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW

660

Vol. 11:2

about half offer alcohol/drug abuse programs and stress
management programs. 00
Employer survey results indicate that about 24% of
workplace smoking-cessation programs, 25% of weightmanagement programs, and 28% of fitness programs offer
financial rewards for participation.101 Apparently, many of
these participation-only incentive programs are what I will
refer to as "targeted" (in that they are offered to particular
individuals based on risk factors or biometric markers
identified via screening), while others are presumably
offered to all individuals without regard to risk factors or
biometric markers.1 02 For example, an employer might offer
an incentive to any individual who attends an on-site
monthly seminar providing nutritional education or a
weekly on-site exercise program. Or the program (and
associated incentive) could be offered only to individuals
who are identified as having high blood pressure or being
overweight.
A smaller-but growing-percentage of programs offer
incentives dependent upon particular risk factors or
biometric values.103 Some programs offer what I will refer
These
to as "status-dependent" financial incentives.
on)
penalties
impose
(or
programs offer rewards to
individuals identified through screening as falling within
100 Id.

101 Id. at 90.
102 The RAND survey does not distinguish between targeted and
non-targeted participation-only incentives, but survey data regarding
the percentage of eligible employees who take advantage of
participation-only programs (with eligibility apparently based on health
status) indicate that many programs are targeted. See id. at 38.
103 As discussed in the introduction, status- and result-based
incentives are expanding rapidly among employers with 1000 or more
employees. See TOWERS WATSON SURVEY, supra note 10, at 22-23
(indicating that among employers with 1000 or more employees 42%
had adopted incentives tied directly to smoking status as of 2014 with
an additional 16% planning to do so in 2015 while 22% used incentives
tied to biometrics like weight and cholesterol in 2014 with an additional
24% reporting that they planned to do so in 2015). These data did not
distinguish among status-dependent, results-dependent, and two-tier
programs but probably encompass all three.
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For example, RAND Employer D

reports an annual premium differential of up to $754 (on
top of premium discounts available for mere completion of
screenings) based solely on biometric readings and smoking
status as assessed during annual onsite clinical
screenings. 104 Similarly, RAND Employer B reports that
smokers are restricted to a lower-value health plan coverage
option. 105
In other cases, a reward is not offered
immediately upon the determination that an individual's
biometrics are within a particular range, but is instead
dependent upon results achieved through participation in
an interventional program (I will call these "resultsdependent").
The RAND survey indicates that 19% of
employers that offer smoking-cessation programs offer
financial incentives for actual cessation (which can be
measured by self-report or through clinical tests), while 6%
of employers offering fitness programs and 3% offering
weight-management
programs
offer
incentives
for
attainment of predetermined weight loss or fitness goals.1 06
Finally, some employers use a "two-tier" approach. For
example, RAND Employer A reports that it imposes a $50
annual insurance premium surcharge for smokers who
decline to participate in a smoking-cessation program or
Id. at 71, 84. Employer D reports that it verifies smoking status
through blood tests. Id. at 70. Cotinine testing detects tobacco use by
measuring a metabolite of nicotine. The RAND study indicates that
among employers who report that they have adopted clinical screenings
(as opposed to self-administered questionnaires) as part of their
wellness programs, 12% screen for tobacco use. Id. at 28. It is unclear,
however, whether this "clinical screening" for tobacco use involves a
cotinine test or simply amounts to a health care provider asking the
patient about tobacco use.
Some employers require prospective
employees to submit to a cotinine test as a condition of employment.
104

See A.G. Sulzberger, Hospital Shifts Smoking Bans to Smoker Ban,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/us/
11smoking.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/UR6E5NAH.
105 Id. There is no reference in the report to whether smokers are
permitted to enroll in the higher-value coverage option if they also
participate in a cessation program, so I will assume that they are not.
106 Id. at 90.
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make use of smoking-cessation products provided by the
employer. RAND Employer C takes a slightly different
approach, imposing a surcharge of up to $600 on smokers
who report that they do not intend to quit smoking. Setting
aside the question of whether the surcharge should be
characterized as a penalty or the absence of it as a reward,
the program can be understood as having two tiers. First,
smokers are separated from non-smokers,107 with nonsmokers automatically avoiding the surcharge (or obtaining
the "reward"). Second, individuals who do smoke are given
the opportunity to do something else to avoid the penalty,
whether that "something else" is simply certifying that they
intend to quit or that they are consuming cessation products
offered by the employer, or actually participating in a
cessation-counseling program. If they do this "something
else," they too will avoid the surcharge. In Table 1, I offer a
summary of the various types of wellness programs
described in the RAND study and the labels I have assigned
to each.
Table 1: Wellness Program Typology Based on
Descriptions in the RAND Report

Employer
Responsibility
Programs

The employer offers services or
alters the worksite for the benefit of
E.g., an employer
all employees.
offers healthy, low-cost meal options
in the cafeteria, provides on-site gym
flu
on-site
hosts
or
facilities,
vaccination clinics.

Non-targeted
Participation-only
Incentive

The employer offers incentives to
all individuals, without regard to
health status or risk factors, for

The RAND study reports that Employers A and C used selfreport to identify smokers (meaning the individuals were asked to
describe their tobacco use). See RAND Report, supranote 38, at 73.
107
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participation
in
intervention
programs, without regard to results.
E.g., all employees are offered a
financial incentive for participating in
a health education seminar about
healthy eating.
I

Targeted
Participation-only
Incentive
Programs

The employer designates particular
individuals as eligible for participation
in intervention programs based on
their health status or risk factors and
offers those employees rewards for
participation,
without regard to
results. E.g., smokers are offered
financial incentives for participating
in a cessation program.

Status-dependent
Incentive
Programs

. The
employer
automatically
applies rewards or penalties based
solely on individuals' health status or
risk factors. E.g., smokers must pay a
premium surcharge; employees with a
body mass index below 26 are offered
a premium discount.

Results-dependent
Incentive
Programs

The employer
offers rewards
conditioned on the achievement of
particular
results
through
intervention
programs
(or
independently). E.g., participants in a
smoking cessation program are offered
a reduction in their co-payment rate
for remaining tobacco-free for six
months; participants in a weight loss
program are offered a premium
discount for losing 5% of their body
weight.
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__________________________________________I

Two-tier Programs

The employer divides individuals
into two groups based on health status
or risk factors.
Individuals in the
"healthy" group are automatically
Those in the
given a reward.
"unhealthy" group are offered the
upon
reward
conditioned
same
in an intervention
participation
program or achievement of particular
results. E.g., smokers must pay a
premium surcharge unless they attend
a weekly smoking cessation program;
non-smokers automatically avoid the
surcharge.

The RAND Report notes that the use and magnitude of
financial incentives for wellness is likely to increase over
time. Nearly 90% of employers with 200 or more employees
report that they plan to add or strengthen financial
incentive programs. 0 8 A 2014 survey of employers with
1000 or more employees found that "the use of incentives . .
. continues to grow significantly-with more focus on results
than mere participation." 109 In spite of the popularity of
incentives among employers, the RAND study reports that
"wellness program managers [have] mixed feelings about
the use of incentives to encourage healthy behaviors," citing
program
wellness
with
conducted
interviews
representatives suggesting that there is a "struggle in the
wellness field in general" over the use of financial
incentives, as opposed to purely intrinsic, health-focused
motivation.110

108

Id. at 88-89.

109 See TOWERS WATSON SURVEY, supra note 10, at 22.
110 Id. at 82.
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2. The Impact of Workplace Wellness Programs
Evaluation of the impact of these programs is limited.
Only about half of employers who have wellness programs
report that they have evaluated them.11 ' The RAND study's
assessment of impact was limited to employer surveys
regarding levels of participation in various components,
supplemented by a small number of case studies of
individual employers for which more detailed data was
available. The results indicate that employee participation
in wellness programs is not widespread. Where screening
components are offered, about half of employees participate
in them.112 Participation in intervention components is
significantly lower. Employers report that only 11% of
eligible employees (with eligibility typically based on risk
assessment results via a targeted approach) participated in
a weight-loss program while only 7% of employees who
smoke participated in a smoking-cessation program within
the last twelve months.113
The RAND study also examined more detailed data
collected from a very small number of employers by the
Care Continuum Alliance ("CCA"), an industry trade group
that represents the interests of wellness program vendors
and other groups interested in disease management. The
CCA data from one large employer suggests that
participation in an exercise program is associated with 0.15
additional days per week during which participants exercise
for twenty or more minutes, when compared to nonparticipants, with diminishing effects in subsequent
years.114
Similar data, also from a single employer,
suggests that smoking rates are 30% lower among
participants in a smoking-cessation program than among
CCA data from four employers
non-participants.115
suggests that participation in a weight-loss, nutrition, or
111 Id. at 53.
112 Id. at 36.
113

114

Id. at 38.
Id. at 44.

115 Id. at 45.
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exercise program is associated with a body mass index
reduction of about 0.15 during the year of participation and
additional, but diminishing reductions in subsequent years.
Overall, the average three-year reduction in body mass
index associated with participation corresponds to a weight
loss of about one pound.11 6 CCA data from four employers
do not indicate a statistically significant reduction in
cholesterol. 117
The data were insufficient to show a
statistically significant reduction in health care costs. The
RAND report notes, however, that other studies have
demonstrated statistically significant health care cost
reductions. For example, a widely reported 2010 metaanalysis suggested that the average return on each dollar
invested in workplace wellness programs was about $3 in
terms of reduction in health care costs and absenteeism.118
B. The Group Health Plan Wellness ProgramException
As described above, some workplace wellness programs
take an approach that emphasizes employer responsibility
for creating a healthier work environment, while others
adopt a personal responsibility approach.
Employer
responsibility programs have the potential to improve the
health of employees without penalizing those who are
perceived as unhealthy.
On the other hand, personal
responsibility programs-especially those that make
premium discounts, surcharges, or cost-sharing reductions
dependent upon the absence of particular risk factors (like
tobacco use) or the maintenance or attainment of "healthy"
biometric values (like a body mass index or cholesterol level
in a particular range), raise the possibility of bringing
prohibited health-status underwriting "in through the back
116 The results were reported in terms of average change in body
mass index, corresponding to weight loss of 0.9 pounds for an average
woman of 165 pounds and 5'4" or about one pound in the average man of
195 pounds and 5'9". Id. at 47.
117 Id. at 51.
118 Id. at 62 (citing Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Welness
ProgramsCan Generate Savings, 29 HEALTH AFF. 304, 304-11 (2010)).
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door."119
Wellness programs that alter the terms of coverage
based on "health status-related factors" (including smoking
status, weight, blood pressure, cholesterol, and other
medical history) are legally permissible for group health
plans only because of an exception to the general rule
prohibiting health plans from discriminating on the basis of
As described below, this exception
these factors. 120
originated in 1996 with HIPAA121 and was fleshed out in
regulations promulgated in 2006.122 In 2010, Congress
119 Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Wellness
Programs and Medicaid FAQs, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Nov. 21,

2012,
4:45
PM),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/11/21/
implementing-health-reform-wellness-programs-and-medicaid-faq, archived
at http://perma.cc/HV6D-8DLE.
120 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(1) (2014) ("A group health plan, and a
health insurance issuer offering health insurance coverage in connection
with a group health plan, may not require any individual (as a condition
of enrollment or continued enrollment under the plan) to pay a premium
or contribution which is greater than such premium or contribution for
a similarly situated individual enrolled in the plan on the basis of any
health status-related factor in relation to the individual or to an
individual enrolled under the plan as a dependent of the individual.");
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(b)(1) (applying the same prohibition to "a health
insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance
coverage") (emphasis added). Note that although smoking status meets
the statutory definition for a health status-related factor, the ACA
allows insurers to vary premium rates by a 1.5 to 1 ratio based on
smoking status, in a provision independent from the wellness program
exception. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv). This provision is relevant
to interpretation of the 2013 wellness program rule and may help
explain why smoking cessation incentives appear to be treated
differently from other kinds of status- or results-based incentives under

the examples set forth in the rule, as described below.
121 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2)(B) (2014) (specifying that the
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of health status-related
factors shall not be construed "to.prevent a group health plan, and a
health insurance issuer offering group health insurance coverage, from
establishing premium discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise
applicable copayments or deductibles in return for adherence to

programs of health promotion and disease prevention.").
122 See Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health
Coverage in the Group Market; Final Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014,
75,017-19 (Dec. 13, 2006) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt.
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imported the wellness program exception from HIPAA into
the ACA.123 The ACA also incorporates additional language
regarding wellness programs from the 2006 Rule. 124
Regulations interpreting the ACA provisions, released in
2013,125 indicate that DHHS is now taking a more skeptical
stance toward personal responsibility incentives. Compared
to the 2006 Rule, which it supersedes, the 2013 Rule
resolves statutory ambiguity in favor of subjecting a wider
range of programs to more stringent requirements and is
thus more likely to ensure that wellness programs are not
used as a subterfuge
for prohibited health-factor

discrimination. 126
2590,
and
45
C.F.R.
pt.
146),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsalregs/fedreg/final/2006009557.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cclM7GB-YDET. Although the Federal Register indicated
that the provisions relevant to wellness programs would be codified at
45 C.F.R. § 146.121(0, in fact the relevant provisions were codified at 29
C.F. R. 2990.702(f) (2007) (superseded). As described below, these
provisions were later superseded by the 2013 Rule, which is codified at
29 C.F.R. 2990.702(f) (2014).
123 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(b)(2)(B) (2014) (specifying that the
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of health status-related
factors shall not be construed "to prevent a group health plan, and a
health insurance issuer offering group health insurance coverage, from
establishing premium discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise
applicable copayments or deductibles in return for adherence to
programs of health promotion and disease prevention.").
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(B) (2014) (adopting language
almost identical to that found in 29 C.F.R. 2990.702(f) (2007)
(superseded)); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(2) (adopting language almost
identical to that found in from 29 C.F.R. 2990.702(f)(1) (2007)
(superseded)); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3) (2014) (adopting language very
similar to that found in 29 C.F.R. 2990.702(0(2) (2007) (superseded) but
with the important addition of language indicating that the
requirements set forth in the statute are not exhaustive, as described
below).
125 See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in
Group Health Plans; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 33158 (Jun. 3, 2013)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2990, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 146,
147) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-06-03/pdfl201312916.pdf.
126 The 2006 Rule, the ACA, and the 2013 Rule all prohibit the use of
wellness programs as a subterfuge for discrimination on the basis of health
status-related factors. See 29 C.F.R. § 2990.702(f)(2)(ii) (2007) (superseded)
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1. The Wellness Program Exception in HIPAA
HIPAA prohibits group plans from discriminating based
on health factors for purposes of eligibility or setting
premiums or contributions. 127 "Health factors" are listed in
HIPAA as "health status; medical condition, including both
physical and mental illnesses; claims experience; receipt of
health care; medical history; genetic information; evidence
of insurability; and disability."128 Plans are prohibited from
imposing differential rates for particular individuals based
on any of these factors. The statute includes a vaguely
defined exception to the general non-discrimination rule
that allows plans to "establish premium discounts or
rebates or modify otherwise applicable copayments or
deductibles in return for adherence to programs of health
promotion and disease prevention."129
In 2006, the
Departments of Health and Human Services, Treasury, and
Laborl 30 jointly issued final regulations delineating the
parameters of this exception.131
(stating that programs that condition a reward on satisfaction of health
status-related standard "must be reasonably designed to promote health or
prevent disease" and specifying that this standard is satisfied if a program
"has a reasonable chance of improving the health of or preventing disease
in participating individuals and is not overly burdensome, is not a

subterfuge for discriminatingbased on a health factor, and is not highly
suspect in the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease.")
(emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4)(3)(B) (2014) (adopting virtually
identical language); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3)(iii) (2014) (adopting virtually
identical language, with the additional provision that determinations
regarding the "reasonable design" standard are "based on all the relevant
facts and circumstances.").
127 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2014) (prohibiting discrimination
against
individual health plan participants and beneficiaries based on health
status)
128 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2)(B) (2014). The 2006 Rule further defined
"Evidence of insurability" to include: "(i) Conditions arising out of acts of
domestic violence; and (ii) Participation in activities such as motorcycling,
snowmobiling, all-terrain vehicle riding, horseback riding, skiing, and other
similar activities." 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(a)(2) (2007) (superseded).
129 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2)(B) (2014).
130 HIPAA, like the ACA after it, amended provisions of the Public
Health Service Act, the Earned Retirement Income Security Act, and

670

INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW

Vol. 11:2

2. The 2006 Wellness ProgramRule
The 2006 Rule distinguished between programs that
condition a reward upon satisfaction of "a standard that is
related to a health factor" and those that do not.132 For
simplicity, I will refer to these as "standard-based" and "nonFor non-standard-based programs (and
standard-based."
those that do not offer a reward in the form of differential
health plan benefits, cost-sharing mechanisms, premiums or
contributions for similarly situated individuals), the only
restriction imposed by the 2006 Rule was that "participation
must be made available to all similarly situated individuals,
regardless of health status." 133
Wellness programs that do condition a reward (in the form
of differential health plan benefits, cost-sharing mechanisms,
premiums or contributions for similarly situated individuals)
upon satisfaction of a standard related to a health factor were
Five
subjected to considerably greater regulation.
requirements for standard-based programs were set forth in
the 2006 Rule: First, the combined reward for achieving all
available wellness program standards must not exceed 20% of
the cost of coverage under the plan. Second, the program
must be "reasonably designed to promote health or prevent
disease." The 2006 Rule specified that this reasonable design
requirement would be satisfied if a program "has a
the Internal Revenue Code. Regulations implementing it fall under the
purview of all three of these Departments.
1s1 Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage
in the Group Market; Final Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,014 (Dec. 13, 2006)
(codified as amended at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt.
146).
132 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f) (2007) (superseded).
133 See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(0(1) (2007) (superseded); 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-4(j)(2) (2014) (identical ACA provision). These programs must also
comply with employment and insurance laws that prohibit discrimination
based on race, age, gender, religious beliefs and observances, and disability.
A program that requires attendance at meetings on Saturday mornings, for
example, might be deemed to discriminate against members of certain
religions. A participation-dependent incentive program that requires
particular physical activities might need to be adjusted to accommodate
employees with physical disabilities.
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reasonable chance of improving the health of or preventing
disease in participating individuals and it is not overly
burdensome, is not a subterfuge for discriminating based on a
health factor, and is not highly suspect in the method chosen
to promote health or prevent disease."134 Third, enrollees
must have the opportunity to qualify for the reward at least
once per year. Fourth, the reward must be available to all
similarly situated individuals. The 2006 Rule specified that
this uniform availability requirement would not be satisfied
unless the program allowed "a reasonable alternative
standard (or waiver of the otherwise applicable standard) for
obtaining the reward for any individual for whom, for that
period, it is unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition
to satisfy the otherwise applicable standard" or for whom it is
"medically inadvisable to attempt to satisfy the otherwise
applicable standard." Finally, the plan must disclose the
availability of an alternative standard or waiver in all plan
materials that describe the terms of the wellness program. 135
For brevity's sake, I will refer to these as the "five
requirements" (see Table 2).
Table 2: Regulation of Wellness Programs
under the 2006 Rule

Non-standardbased

Standard-based

Participation in the
program must be
made available to
all
similarly
situated
individuals.

1) The total available reward for
all standard-based wellness
programs must not exceed 20%
of the cost of coverage under
the plan.
2) The
program
must
be

134 See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(2)(ii) (2007) (superseded); 42
U.S.C.
§ 300gg-4(j)(3) (2014) (nearly identical ACA provision).
135 See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(2) (2007) (superseded); 42 U.S.C. §

300gg-4(j)(3) (2014) (identical ACA provision).
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reasonably designed to promote
health or prevent disease. A
program satisfies this standard
if it has a reasonable chance of
improving the health of or
in
disease
preventing
participating individuals and it
is not overly burdensome, is
for
subterfuge
a
not
discriminating based on a
health factor, and is not highly
suspect in the method chosen
to promote health or prevent
disease.
3) Eligible individuals must be
given
the opportunity
to
qualify for the reward at least
once per year.
4) The reward must be available
situated
similarly
to
all
individuals. To satisfy this
program
requirement,
the
reasonable
allow a
must
alternative standard (or waiver
applicable
otherwise
of
standard) for any individual for
whom is its unreasonably
difficult due to a medical
or
to
satisfy
condition
to
inadvisable
medically
the
satisfy
to
attempt
otherwise applicable standard.
5) The availability of a reasonable
alternative standard or waiver
(as set forth in requirement
four) must be disclosed in plan
the
describing
materials
wellness program.
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The test for determining whether a program would be
regulated as standard-based was not fully fleshed out in the
2006 Rule. Some types of programs described in the RAND
study are easily classified as non-standard-based:
Employer responsibility programs (like RAND Employer B's
healthy, low-cost lunch special in the cafeteria) enhance the
work environment for all employees without offering
financial rewards to anyone in particular and therefore
would not be subject to the five requirements.136 Programs
offering incentives for participation in a health screening
without regard to the results (like RAND Employer D's
premium differential for health screening participation)
would also not be subject to the five requirements because
they do not distinguish among individuals based on health
factors in any way. Personal responsibility programs that
provide incentives for participation in intervention
programs (without regard to the results) and are nontargeted (in that they are offered to all individuals without
regard to biometrics or risk factors) would also be in the
clear.137 Although these programs typically do relate to
behaviors (like diet or exercise) that are associated with
health, they do not adopt a particular health-related
136 Among the examples of programs that do not condition a reward
on a standard related to health status provided in the 2006 Rule are
three that clearly describe "employer responsibility" programs. See 29
C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(1)(i) (2007) (superseded) ("A program that
reimburses all or part of the cost for memberships in a fitness center.");
29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(1)(iii) (2007) (superseded) ("A program that
encourages preventive care through the waiver of the copayment or
deductible requirement under a group health plan for the costs of, for
example, prenatal care or well-baby visits."); 29 C.F.R. §
2590.702(f)(1)(iv) (2007) (superseded) ("A program that reimburses
employees for the costs smoking cessation programs without regard to
whether the employee quits smoking.").
137 Among the examples of programs that do not condition a reward on
a standard related to health status provided in the 2006 Rule, are two that
seem to describe non-targeted participation-dependent programs. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2590.702(f)(1)(ii) (2007) (superseded) ("A diagnostic testing program that
provides a reward for participation and does not base any part of the reward
on outcomes."); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(1)(v) (2007) (superseded) ("A
program that provides a reward to employees for attending a monthly
health education seminar.").
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As non-targeted
standard beyond mere participation.
participation-only programs, they do not distinguish among
individuals based on health status-related factors in any
way.
At the other end of the spectrum are programs that are
easily classified as standard-based under the 2006 Rule:
"Status-dependent" programs that provide rewards only to
individuals who fall within particular health-related
parameters clearly would be subject to the five
Similarly, "results-dependent" programs
requirements.
that provide rewards to individuals who achieve a
particular outcome as the result of an interventional
program (e.g., by actually quitting smoking or achieving a
pre-defined weight loss or fitness goal) would also be treated
as standard-based. 138 These programs condition a reward
on a standard related to health factors, whether by singling
out particular individuals directly based on health status
(e.g., RAND Employer D's $754 premium differential tied to
biometric data and clinical test results) or by doing so at the
conclusion of an interventional program (e.g., the small
percentage of employers who report offering financial
incentives for diet or exercise programs tied to the
achievement of particular weight loss goals).
The examples provided in the 2006 Rule to illustrate standardsbased programs that do and do not comply with the five requirements all
describe programs that provide rewards based solely on whether an
employee falls within defined health-factor parameters. See 29 C.F.R. §
2590.702(0(3)(Example 2) (2007) (superseded) ("A group health plan offers
an annual premium discount of 20 percent of employee-only coverage to
participants who adhere to a wellness program. The wellness program
consists solely of giving an annual cholesterol test to participants. Those
participants who achieve a count under 200 receive the premium discount
for the year."); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3) (Example 4) (2007) (superseded)
("A group health plan will waive the $250 deductible ... for the following
year for participants who have a body mass index between 19 and 26"); 29
C.F.R. § 2590.702(0(3) (Example 5) (2007) (superseded) ("In conjunction
with an annual open enrollment period, a group health plan provides a form
for participants to certify that they have not used tobacco products in the
preceding twelve months. Participants who do not provide the certification
are assessed a surcharge that is 20 percent of the cost of employee-only
coverage.").
138
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While some programs are easily classified as standardbased or not, the status of other programs described in the
RAND study was somewhat ambiguous under the 2006
Rule- particularly those that I have described above as
"targeted" and "two-tier" (see Table 3). The status of targeted
and two-tier programs matters quite a lot given the RAND
study's indication that results-based rewards are relatively
rare, while targeted and two-tier programs appear to be more
common. 139 Targeted participation-only incentive programs
(which identify particular individuals as eligible for
interventional programs based on screening results, then
offer rewards to eligible individuals for participation without
regard to the results) could arguably have been classified
either way under the 2006 Rule.
Similarly, "two-tier"
programs that require participation in an interventional
program as an alternative pathway for individuals who fail to
satisfy an initial biometric or risk factor standard straddle
the line between the two types of programs described in the
2006 Rule. None of the examples provided in the 2006 Rule
clearly describes either a targeted or two-tier program.
Table 3: Classifying Wellness Programs under
the 2006 Rule

Clearly Nonstandard-based
Employer
Responsibility

Ambiguous

Clearly Standardbased

Targeted
Participation-only

Status-dependent
Incentive Programs

139 See RAND Report, supra note 38, at 83 (indicating that although

69% of employers offer financial incentives for participation, only between 3
and 12% of those employers offer what the RAND report refers to as
"results-based" incentives, depending on the type of program). As noted
above, the RAND study did not explicitly distinguish between targeted and
non-targeted participatory programs, but survey results identifying the
percentage of "eligible" employees who participated in interventional
programs suggest that many, if not most interventional programs target
particular employees by basing eligibility on health status-related factors
like smoking status or body mass index.
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Programs
(e.g.,
employer offers a
healthy, low-cost
lunch special in
the cafeteria)
Non-targeted
Participationonly Incentive
Programs
(e.g., any
individual is
eligible to receive
a premium
discount for
participation in
an onsite health
screening or
physical fitness
program, without
regard to results)
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Incentive
Programs
(e.g.,
individuals are
deemed eligible for
participation in an
on-site weight
management
program if their
body mass index is
26 or higher;
eligible
individuals receive
a premium
discount for
attending the
program,
regardless of
results)
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(e.g., a premium
surcharge is
imposed on all
individuals with a
body mass index
above 26)
Results-dependent
Incentive Programs
(e.g., individuals
who lose 5% of their
body weight over a
defined period of
time earn a
premium discount)

Two-tier
Programs
(e.g.,
individuals with
body mass index
under 26 receive a
premium discount;
individuals with
body mass index of
26 or above are
eligible to receive
the same discount
only if they attend
a weekly onsite
weight-loss
program

The 2006 Rule states that "if any of the conditions for
obtaining a reward under a wellness program is based on an
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individual satisfying a standard that is related to a health
factor," then it must satisfy the five requirements to comply
with
HIPAA's
prohibition
on
health-status
4
0
discrimination.1
Ultimately, targeted and two-tier
programs allow individuals to earn rewards merely for
participating in an interventional program and therefore do
not truly requireindividuals to satisfy a standard related to
a health factor to obtain a reward. An interpretation that
equates being "based on" satisfaction of a health-related
standard with "requiring" satisfaction of a health-related
standard as the only means to earn a reward would be
reasonable and would exempt targeted and two-tier
programs from the five requirements.
Indeed, the
information reported about the two RAND employers that
have health status and risk factor reward adopted two-tier
programs does not appear to indicate that the employers
have treated those programs as being subject to the five
requirements that the 2006 Rule set forth for standardbased programs.141
On the other hand, it would also be reasonable to
interpret "based on" satisfaction of a health-related
standard more broadly to encompass programs that single
out particular individuals for differential treatment based
on whether they satisfy an initial health-related standard.
Under this interpretation, targeted and two-tier programs
wouldbe subject to the five requirements.
Two-tier programs designate particular individuals for
differential treatment by requiring them to participate in an
intervention program to earn the same reward that other
individuals earn simply by being themselves. Under RAND
Employer A's two-tier program, for example, non-smokers
140

See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(2) (2007) (superseded) (emphasis

added).
The report specifically notes that Employer D's statusdependent incentive program complies with the 2006 Rule by offering
an alternative standard to employees for whom it would be impossible
due to a medical condition to achieve or medically inadvisable to
attempt satisfaction of the primary standard. See RAND Report, supra
note 38, at 86. Similar information is notably absent with regard to the
two-tier programs offered by Employers A and C.
141
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automatically avoid the $50 annual insurance premium
surcharge, while smokers must participate in an
interventional program to avoid the penalty. Two-tier
programs might be characterized as status-dependent
incentive programs that include a second tier to meet the
"reasonable alternative standard" requirement. If that is
the case, however, then the adoption of a second tier to
satisfy (and only partially) one of the five requirements of
the 2006 Rule should not automatically exempt the program
from the remaining requirements set forth for standardbased programs by reclassifying it as non-standard-based.
For example, simply because RAND Employer A offers a
participation-only pathway to receive the same reward
offered to non-smokers based on their status alone, should
not mean that the employer is exempt from offering an
alternative to participating in the cessation program (which
may include the use of cessation aids like nicotine patches
or gum) for individuals for whom it would be medically
inadvisable.
Targeted programs designate particular individuals for
differential treatment by deeming them eligible for
participation-dependent rewards while other individuals are
not. Although targeted programs might be understood as
giving preferential treatment to "unhealthy" individuals
while deeming "healthier" individuals ineligible for
incentives, the singling out of particular individuals as
"unhealthy" and in need of education, instruction,
counseling, or physical activity could create a hostile work
environment.
This concern is particularly salient for
employees targeted on the basis of their weight, given that
weight-based employment discrimination and harassment is
widespread and has significant negative impacts on both
physical and psycho-social health.142
To the extent that the 2006 Rule's definition of standardbased wellness programs could be construed narrowly to
subject only status- and results-dependent programs to
142 See Wiley, Shame, supra note 18, at 174 (describing the ways in
which workplace wellness programs might contribute to stigma and
discrimination based on weight).
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significant regulation, the wellness program exception to

HIPAA's general prohibition on health-factor discrimination
was quite broad. The status of targeted and two-tier
programs is important. As noted above, the RAND study
indicates that these types of programs are considerably
more common than status- and results-dependent
programs. While they do not raise the specter of "backdoor" health-status underwriting to quite the same extent
that status-dependent programs do, they could drive away
"unhealthy" employees by creating an environment that is
hostile to those who smoke, are overweight, or have other
biometric risk factors. In this sense, targeted and two-tier
programs (just like status-dependent programs) might cut
an employer's health care costs not by prompting employees
to become healthier, but rather by shifting costs onto
Status-dependent programs shift
unhealthy employees.
costs to unhealthy employees directly by charging them
higher deductibles, copays or coinsurance. Targeted, twotier, and results-dependent programs have the potential to
shift costs away from an employer by driving unhealthy
employees out of that particular employer's workforce.

3. The Wellness ProgramException in the ACA
Inspired by media reports of successful employer
wellness programs,143 Congress adopted and expanded the
wellness program exception in 2010 as part of the ACA. As
noted above, the ACA incorporated language from HIPPA's
statutory text. 144 It also incorporated significant language

143 See Steven A. Burd, How Safeway Is CuttingHealth -Care Costs,
WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124476804026308603.html (an op-ed piece by the CEO of Safeway,
Inc., arguing that Congress should "raise the federal legal limits" on
workplace wellness incentives), archived at http://perma.cc/9FTXLUWN; Hilzenrath, supra note 74 (describing how reports regarding the
Safeway wellness program influenced the workplace wellness
amendment and questioning previous reports of the Safeway program's
success).
144 See supra note 123.
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from the 2006 Rule.145 Particularly interesting, however,
are the subtle changes that Congress made to the exception.
On the one hand, Congress seemingly "doubled down" on
wellness programs by raising the cap on the overall value
wellness program incentives from 20% to 30% across the
board with flexibility for implementing agencies to raise it
as high as 50%.146 On the other hand, the text of the ACA
includes a few other seemingly minor alterations to the
language of the 2006 Rule. In particular, the ACA added a
key phrase to its description of the uniform availability
requirementl 47 confirming that DHHS has flexibility to
See supra note 124.
Under the 2006 Rule, the combined reward for achieving all
available wellness program standards could not exceed 20% of the
employee's cost of coverage under the plan.
See 29 C.F.R. §
2990.702(f)(2)(i) (2007) (superseded). The ACA raises this cap to 30%
and gives the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and Health and Human
Services additional authority to extend it to 50%. See 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-4(j)(3)(A).
147 Compare 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(2)(iv) (2007) (superseded) ("The
reward under the program must be available to all similarly situated
individuals. (A) A reward is not available to all similarly situated
individuals for a period unless [the program makes a reasonable
alternative standard or waiver available to particular employees for
whom it would be unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition to
achieve or medically inadvisable to attempt to satisfy the otherwise
applicable standard].") with 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D) (2014) ("The
full reward under the wellness program shall be made available to all
similarly situated individuals. For such purposes, among other things:
(i) The reward is not available to all similarly situated individuals for a
period unless [the program makes a reasonable alternative standard or
waiver available to particular employees for whom it would be
unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition to achieve or medically
inadvisable to attempt to satisfy the otherwise applicable standard].")
(emphasis added). The addition of the phrase "among other things" in
the text of the ACA provides additional support for the argument that
Congress intended to grant the implementing agencies discretion to
impose additional requirements as the agency deemed necessary. Thus,
although commentators do not appear to have anticipated that the 2013
Rule would be considerably more protective of employees than the 2006
Rule, the greater protection provided by the agencies in the 2013 Rule
appears to be consistent with the language of the statute and with
congressional intent to prohibit the use of wellness programs as a
subterfuge for health-status discrimination. Other subtle changes also
145

146
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impose additional regulatory requirements on the most
concerning types of programs to ensure that incentives are
available to all employees and not used as a subterfuge for
discrimination, as Congress intended. These subtle, but
important changes paved the way for DHHS to narrow the
wellness program exception in the 2013 Rule, as described
below.
4. The 2013 Wellness ProgramRule
The Final Rule on Incentives for Nondiscriminatory
Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans issued by DHHS
and the Departments of Labor and Treasury in 2013 fleshed
out the wellness program exception in considerably greater
detail than the 2006 Rule. Ultimately, the 2013 Rule
significantly narrowed the wellness program exception to
HIPAA and ACA non-discrimination provisions by
subjecting broader categories of programs to more stringent
requirements and thus affording greater protection to
employees from health-related discrimination.
The 2013 Rule labels and defines three categories of
wellness programs: (1) "participatory wellness programs,"
(2) "activity-only health-contingent wellness programs," and
(3) "outcome-based health-contingent wellness programs"
and subjects each to distinct regulatory requirements.
First, the 2013 Rule re-styles the non-standard-based
category from the 2006 Rule as "participatory" and the

indicate congressional intent to give the agency discretion to tighten the
regulations applicable to wellness programs. For example, a partial
grandfathering clause notes that wellness programs established prior to
the enactment of the ACA that complied with all applicable regulations
(presumably referencing the 2006 Rule) may continue to be carried out
for as long as those regulations remain in effect. The most reasonable
interpretation of this provision is that Congress intended for wellness
programs that pre-date the ACA (and were compliant with the 2006
Rule) to be required to comply with any more stringent regulations that
the agencies might ultimately promulgate superseding the 2006 Rule.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(k)(2) (2014).
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standard-based category as "health-contingent." 148 It then
defines "health-contingent" more clearly than the 2006 Rule
defined "standards-based."
Under the 2013 Rule, the
implementing agencies classify a program as healthcontingent (and thus subject to the five requirements) if it
"requires an individual to satisfy a standard related to a
health factor to obtain a reward" or "requires an individual
to undertake more than a similarly situated individual
based on a health factor in order to obtain the same
reward."149 In doing so, the agencies effectively adopt the
broader reading of the phrase "based on an individual
satisfying a standard that is related to a health status
factor" (which was imported from the 2006 Rule into the
text of the ACA), discussed above. Whereas the status of
targeted and two-tier programs under the 2006 Rule was
ambiguous and there was some evidence in the RAND
report that employers did not treat them as subject to the
five requirements, under the 2013 Rule, targeted and twotier programs are clearly treated as health-contingent and
subjected to greater regulation.
The 2013 Rule goes on to subdivide health-contingent
programs into "activity-only" and "outcome-based." "An
activity-only wellness program is a type of healthcontingent wellness program that requires an individual to
perform or complete an activity related to a health factor in
order to obtain a reward but does not require the individual
to attain or maintain a specific health outcome." 5 0 This
definition encompasses targeted participation-only incentive
programs, which single individuals for participation based
on health factors and further "relate to" those health factors
by aiming to alter them.15
Arguably, activity-only health-contingent programs
See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(1)(ii) (2014) (defining participatory
wellness programs); id. at § 2590.702(f)(1)(iii) (defining healthcontingent wellness programs).
148

149

Id.

Id.
The examples provided in the Rule describe a participation-only
walking program that targets individuals based on body mass index as
an activity only program. See id. § 2590.702(f)(4)(vi)(Example 4)(ii).
150

151
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would also encompass all participation-only incentive
programs, but there must be a sensible line between
participatory programs and activity-only health-contingent
programs, given that the 2013 Rule recognizes a
"participatory wellness program" category and subjects it to
minimal regulation in the way that the 2006 Rule treated
"non-standard-based" programs.
The examples of
participatory programs provided in the 2013 Rule all
describe either employer responsibility programs 152 or nontargeted participation-only incentive programs that do not
require physical activity.153 The examples of activity-only
health-contingent programs provided in the 2013 Rule
include what appears to be a non-targeted participationonly incentive program that does require physical
activity.154 A sensible conclusion then is that although most
non-targeted participation-only incentive programs are
See id. § 2590.702(f)(1)(ii)(A) ("A program that reimburses
employees for all or part of the cost for membership in a fitness
center."); id § 2590.702(f)(1)(ii)(C) ("A program that encourages
preventive care through the waiver of the copayment or deductible
requirement under a group health plan for the costs of, for example,
prenatal care or well-baby visits.").
15s See id. § 2590.702(f)(1)(ii)(B) ("A diagnostic testing program that
provides a reward for participation in that program and does not base
any part of the reward on outcomes."); id § 2590.702(f)(1)(ii)(D) ("A
program that reimburses employees for the costs of participating or that
otherwise provides a reward for participating, in a smoking cessation
program without regard to whether the employee quits smoking."); id §
2590.702(f)(1)(ii)(E) ("A program that provides a reward to employees
for attending a monthly, no-cost health education seminar."); id §
2590.702(f)(1)(ii)(F) ("A program that provides a reward to employees
who complete a health risk assessment regarding current health status,
without any further action (educational or otherwise) required by the
employee with regard to the health issues identified as part of the
assessment.").
154 See id.
§ 2590.702(f)(3)(iv) ("A group health plan provides a
reward to individuals who participate in a reasonable specified walking
program. If it is unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition for an
individual to participate (or if it is medically inadvisable for an
individual to attempt to participate), the plan will waive the program
requirement and provide the reward. All materials describing the terms
152

of the walking program disclose the availability of the waiver.

program satisfies [the five requirements].").

. .

. The
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treated as "participatory" under the 2013 Rule, targeted
participation-only incentive programs that require physical
activities that may be inaccessible to some employees based
on their health factors are regulated as activity-only healthcontingent programs. 155 Notably, these programs might
readily have been understood to be non-standards-based
programs that were subject to the most minimal regulation
under the 2006 rule, while the 2013 Rule subjects them to
the five requirements.
Finally, outcome-based health-contingent
wellness
programs are defined to encompass any program "that
requires an individual to attain or maintain a specific
health outcome (such as not smoking or attaining certain
results on biometric screenings) in order to obtain a
reward."156 This definition clearly encompasses the statusand results-dependent incentive programs that were
already subject to the five requirements under the 2006
Rule. But the 2013 Rule goes on to clarify that the fact that
an outcome-based wellness program offers an alternative
pathway to obtain the same reward (via participation in an
intervention program) to all individuals who fail to meet the
initial standard (as required by the heightened "reasonable
Some confusion remains, however, about the status of targeted
participation-dependent incentive programs for smoking cessation
under the 2013 Rule. A workplace wellness program that directs
identified smokers to a smoking cessation program and provides them
with a reward for participation regardless of whether they actually quit
smoking would seem to fit the regulatory definition of an activity-only
health-contingent program, subject to the weaker form of the five
requirements. A two-tiered program that identifies non-smokers and
rewards them and then offers the same reward to smokers only if they
participate in a smoking cessation program would be bumped up to an
outcome-based health-contingent program subject to the stronger form
of the five requirements. On the other hand, the 2013 Rule describes an
incentive for participating in a smoking cessation program as an
example of a participatory program not subject to the five requirements
at all. Notably, smoking status is also singled out for less protection by
the higher cap on rewards for smoking cessation programs. As noted
above, the differential treatment of smoking may be explained by the
fact that an independent ACA provision permits insurers to charge
higher premiums to tobacco users (at a ratio of 1 to 1.5).
e56Id. § 2590.702(f)(1)(v).
155
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design" requirement described below) does not render the
program "participatory" or even "activity-based." 5 7 "[I]f a
measurement, test, or screening program is used as part of
an initial standard and individuals who meet the standard
are granted the reward, the program is considered an
outcome-based wellness program." The regulations also
provide an example for further clarification:
[I]f a wellness program tests individuals for
specified medical conditions or risk factors
(including biometric screening such as testing
for high cholesterol, high blood pressure,
abnormal body mass index, or high glucose
level) and provides a reward to individuals
identified as within a normal or healthy range
for these medical conditions or risk factors,
while requiring individuals who are identified
as outside the normal or healthy range (or at
risk) to take additional steps (such as meeting
with a health coach, taking a health or fitness
course, adhering to a health improvement
action plan, complying with a walking or
exercise program, or complying with a health
care provider's plan of care) to obtain the same
reward, the program is an outcome-based
wellness program.158
Thus, two-tier programs (which were arguably nonstandard-based programs under the 2006 Rule) are clearly
subject to the most stringent regulation under the 2013
Rule. Table 4 summarizes the classification of various types
of wellness programs under the 2013 Rule.

157

_[d

158

Id.
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Table 4: Classifying Wellness Programs under
the 2013 Rule

Participatory

Activity-based
Health Contingent

Outcomebased Health
Contingent

Employer
Responsibility
Programs
(e.g., employer
offers a healthy,
low-cost lunch
special in the
cafeteria)

Non-targeted
Participation-only
Incentive Programs
that involve
physical activity
(e.g., any
individual is
eligible to receive a
reduction in their
co-pay for
participating in a
walking program,
without regard to
results)

Status-dependent
Incentive
Programs
(e.g., a
premium
surcharge is
imposed on all
individuals with a
body mass index
above 26)

Non-targeted
Participation-only
Incentive Programs
that do not involve
physical activity
(e.g., any
individual is
eligible to receive a
premium discount
for participation in
an onsite health
screening or health
education seminar,
without regard to
results)

Targeted
Participation-only
Incentive Programs
(e.g., individuals
are deemed eligible
for participation in
an on-site weight
management
program if their
body mass index is
26 or higher;
eligible individuals
receive a premium
discount for
attending the
program,
regardless of

Resultsdependent
Incentive
Programs
(e.g.,
individuals who
lose 5% of their
body weight over
a defined period of
time earn a
premium
discount)
Two-tier
Programs
(e.g.,
individuals with
body mass index
under 26 receive a
premium
discount;
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individuals with

body mass index
of 26 or above are
eligible to receive
the same discount
only if they attend

a weekly onsite
weight-loss
program

In addition to resolving ambiguity over which categories
of plans are subject to the five requirements, the 2013 Rule
also elaborates upon those requirements in a way that
ensures their stringency as a barrier to "back-door" healthbased underwriting. The 2013 Rule creates two distinct
versions of the five requirements imported from the 2006
Rule into the ACA-one for activity-based programs and
another for outcome-based programs-and elaborates
additional factors and requirements applicable to each.
Table 5 summarizes these regulatory requirements.
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Table 5: Regulation of Wellness Programs
under the 2013 Rule

Participatory

Participation in
the program
must be made
available to all
similarly
situated
individuals.

Activitybased Healthcontingent
Same as the five
requirements
under the 2006
Rule, except:
1) Cap on
reward value is
raised to 30%
(50% for
smoking).
2) If the
reasonable
alternative
standard is an
educational
program, the
plan must make
it available or
assist the
employee in
finding a
program, the
time
commitment
must be
reasonable, and
if the
alternative is a
diet program,
the plan must
I pay the

Outcome-based
Health-contingent

Same as for activitybased programs,
except:
1) The program must
provide an alternative
standard to any
individual who does
not meet the initial
standard; the plan
may not seek
verification from an
individual's personal
physician that a
health factor makes it
unreasonably difficult
for the individual to
satisfy, or medically
inadvisable to attempt
to satisfy the
otherwise applicable
standard.
2) If the alternative
standard is itself an
outcome-based
program, it too must
comply with the five
requirements.
3) The alternative
standard cannot be a
requirement to meet a
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membership or
participation
fee.
3) The
alternative
standard must
accommodate
any
recommendation
s of the
individual's
personal
physician
regarding
medical
appropriateness
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different level of the
same standard
without additional
time.

4) An individual must
be given the
opportunity to comply
with the
recommendations of
her personal physician
as an alternative to
meeting the
alternative standard
defined by the plan.

4) If the
alternative
standard is
itself an
activity-only
program, it too
must comply
with the five
requirements

The most notable enhancement to the requirements for
activity-only programs relate to the uniform availability and
reasonable alternative standard requirements.
To be
considered uniformly available, an outcome-based program
must allow a reasonable alternative standard for obtaining
the same reward (or a waiver of the standard altogether) for
any individual for whom it is unreasonably difficult due to a
medical condition to satisfy or medically inadvisable to
attempt to satisfy the otherwise applicable standard.15 9 The
1e Id. § 2590.702(f)(3)(iv)(A)(1)-(2). The Rule clarifies that a plan
or issuer may seek verification, including a statement from an
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Rule also specifies several factors that will be among those
taken into account in determining whether the program
satisfies the uniform availability requirement: "If the
reasonable alternative standard is completion of an
educational program, the plan or issuer must make the
educational program available or assist the individual in
finding such a program (instead of requiring an individual
to find such a program unassisted), and may not require an
individual to pay for the cost of the program." 6 0
Additionally, "[ilf the reasonable alternative standard is a
diet program, the plan or issuer is not required to pay for
the cost of food but must pay any membership or
participation fee."161 The time commitment required must
also be reasonable.1 62
With regard to outcome-based programs, the reasonable
design requirement is significantly expanded as compared
"To ensure that an outcome-based
to the 2006 Rule.
wellness program is reasonably designed to improve health
and does not act as a subterfuge for underwriting or
reducing benefits based on a health factor, a reasonable
alternative standard to qualify for the reward must be
provided to any individual who does not meet the initial
standard based on the measurement, test, or screening that
is related to a health factor."163 This is an important new
requirement that will go a long way toward ensuring that
wellness programs are not simply used to shift costs onto
less healthy individuals. Previously, the only individuals
for whom a reasonable alternative standard must be offered
were those whose personal physicians could verify, upon
request, that they met the "unreasonably difficult/medically
inadvisable" standard. The 2013 requirement, in contrast,
requires an alternative pathway for all individuals who do
individual's personal physician that an employee falls into this category.
See id. § 2590.702(f)(3)(iv)(E).
160 Id.
§ 2590.702 (f)(3)(iv)(C)(1).
Presumably the same
and not only the
standard
initial
the
to
apply
would
requirement
standard.
alternative
reasonable
161 Id. § 2590.702(f)(3)(iv)(C)(3).
162 Id. § 2590.702(f)(3)(iv)(C)(2).
163 Id. § 2590.702(f)(4)(iii) (emphasis added).
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not meet the initial outcome-based standard.
This
requirement effectively renders status- and resultdependent programs (which surveys indicate are extremely
popular among large employers) considerably less attractive
by imposing considerable burdens on employers or health
plans to pay for individuals to participate in alternative
programs and by allowing many employees to obtain the
same reward without satisfying outcome-based standards
(by requiring programs to offer compliance with the
recommendations of the individual's personal physician as
an alternative, regardless of whether the individual has a
medical excuse for not satisfying or attempting to satisfy
the initial standard. It requires that these programs follow
the two-tier model, and it seems likely that in many cases,
that second (or third, or fourth) alternative tier will
ultimately have to be a non-outcome-based alternative.
C Support for Small Business Workplace
Wellness Programs
In addition to the wellness-programs exception for group
health plans, the ACA authorized the appropriation of $200
million for grants to businesses with fewer than 100
employees to establish "comprehensive" workplace wellness
programs. 164 The statute defined "comprehensive' programs
as those that include (1) "[health awareness initiatives
(including health education, preventive screenings, and
health risk assessments)"; (2) "[e]fforts to maximize
employee engagement (including mechanisms to encourage
employee participation)"; (3) "[i]nitiatives to change
unhealthy behaviors and lifestyle choices (including
counseling, seminars, online programs, and self-help
materials)"; and (4) "[s]upportive environment efforts
(including workplace policies to encourage healthy
lifestyles, healthy eating, increased physical activity, and
improved mental health)."165
164 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119, 978, § 10408(e) (2010).
165

Id.
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Congress has failed to appropriate funds for the
statutory grant program. Nonetheless, in 2011, DHHS
announced that it was making $10 million from the ACA's
Prevention and Public Health Fund available to support
workplace wellness programs for employers with fewer than
100 employees that did not previously have a program in
place. 166 This program appears to be responsive to some
aspects of the statutory small business grants while also
fulfilling another ACA. provision's mandate that the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provide
technical support for workplace wellness provisions. 167 The
agency ultimately awarded grants to establish and evaluate
a new national network to provide technical support to
between 70 and 100 large and small employers developing
new wellness programs. 168
While the statutory criteria for the small business grant
program primarily emphasize personal responsibility
programs and incentives for participation in them, the
program that DHHS ultimately created has a much
stronger emphasis on employer responsibility. The concrete
examples described in the award announcement could all be
described as employer responsibility programs with a
particular emphasis on changes to the worksite
environment: "Tobacco-free campus policy, subsidized quitsmoking counseling (quitlines, health plans, others) [;
w]orksite farmer's market, nutrition counseling/education,
menu labeling on healthy foods, healthy foods in cafeterias
and vending, weight management counseling[; and
fitness/lifestyle
physical
enhancement,
s]tairwell
166

Press Release, Dep't Health and Human Servs., $10 Million in

Affordable Care Act Funds to Help Create Workplace Health Programs
(June 23, 2011).
167

See 42 U.S.C. § 2801 (2014); see also Healthier Worksite

Initiative, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpaolhwi/ (last updated Feb. 9, 2010) (The
CDC provides this support directly, in addition to funding support and
evaluation by private organizations.).
168 Workplace Health Promotion, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/nhwp/ (last
updated Oct. 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/8UDD-AZ76.
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counseling, walking trails/clubs, flextime policy."1 69 The
announcement also notes that successful programs will
"create a health-promoting environment that establishes a
culture of health within the worksite."170
D. The IndividualInsurance Wellness Program
Demonstration Project
Although the ACA extended anti-discrimination
protections to the individual market, the wellness program
exception discussed above remains restricted to the group
market. Rather than allowing individual-market insurers
to adopt wellness programs right away, the statute
mandated that DHHS establish a ten-state demonstration
project whereby states will be allowed to apply the wellness
program provisions to the individual market.171 By statute,
the initial demonstration project must be established no
later than July 2014, with authorization to extend the
program to additional states in 2017.
The statute sketches out several requirements for
approval of a state's participation in the demonstration
project, designed to ensure that the program does not run
counter to the ACA's broader goals. States may permit
premium discounts or rebates or alter otherwise applicable
copays or deductibles as a reward for "adherence to, or
participation in, a reasonably designed program of health
promotion and disease prevention." 172
However, the
Secretaries must design the project so as to avoid any
decrease in coverage or increase in cost to the federal
government in terms of premium assistance and costsharing reduction subsidies offered via the Exchanges.1 73
Participating states must also ensure that various
consumer protection requirements imposed on individualmarket plans are satisfied by demonstration project plans
169

170
171

Id
Id.

See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4() (2014).

172

Id.

173

Id. § 300g-4 (3)(A)(i)-(ii).
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and must require verification from participating health
insurance issuers that discounts "do not create undue
burdens" for insureds, "do not lead to cost shifting," and "are
not a subterfuge for discrimination."1 7 4
While the mid-2014 deadline looms closer, as of this
writing, DHHS has taken no apparent action to implement
it. The agencies did not address the demonstration project
in any way in the 2013 Rule, in spite of comments from the
American Association of Health Plans urging them to do
SO.175

E. The MedicaidIncentives for Prevention of Chronic
DiseaseProgram
Just as many private health plans have adopted
personal responsibility for wellness
incentive-based
programs, several states (who take on the role of third party
payers with respect to the Medicaid program) have also
sought to establish incentive-based personal responsibility
for wellness programs for Medicaid recipients. Federal law
restrains the ability of states to impose premium
contributions and cost-sharing arrangements on Medicaid
recipients, but those restraints were loosened considerably
Shortly
by the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act ("DRA").
thereafter, DHHS granted several section 1115 waivers that
allowed states to adopt a wide range of experimentation in
this area. As described below, DHHS implementation of
this program reflects growing skepticism toward programs
that tie the terms of coverage to risk factors and health
174

Id.

Letter from Daniel T. Durham, Executive Vice President, & Thomas
J. Wilder, Senior Counsel, America's Health Insurance Plans, to U.S.
Department of Labor 9 (Jan. 25, 2013) ("It will take time for states to apply
for the Demonstration Project and design wellness programs and for
insurers to implement the programs. We believe it is critical for HHS to
work with stakeholders and to release the program requirements as soon as
possible in order to allow such wellness programs in the individual market
available at http://op.bna.com/hl.nsflid/shadstarting in 2014."),
94dsh2/$File/Wellness%20Incentives%20Proposed%2ORule%2OComments%
20(AHIP,%2001.25.13).pdf, archivedathttp://perma.cc/53U-36A9.
175
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third-party-payer

1. FederalRestraintson the Implementation of
Incentive-basedPersonalResponsibilityfor Wellness
MedicaidPrograms
Medicaid was designed to meet the particular needs of
very low-income families and disabled adults and thus has
traditionally included many features that make it distinct
from private health insurance. 176 Prior to the DRA, states
were prohibited from charging monthly premiums in any
amount and nominal co-pays were permitted only for
certain recipients.' 77 The DRA gives states considerably
greater freedom to redesign their Medicaid programs in
ways that bring them into line with typical private health
plans. States are permitted to adopt these changes without
the need for a section 1115 waiver, though they do require
submission of a State Plan Amendment to DHHS.178 States
are permitted to shift many recipients into privatized
managed care plans. 7 9 They may also charge monthly
premiums to recipients living above 150% of the Federal
Poverty Level ("FPL"). States may require greater cost
sharing-up to the levels typically seen in many private
health plans-for many Medicaid recipients'8 0 (with the
The Medicaid Program at a Glance, THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (MAR. 4, 2013), http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/themedicaid-program-at-a-glance-update/,
archived at http://perma.cc/
LJR9-KHPN.
177 See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT: IMPORTANT FACTS FOR STATE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS,
available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/DeficitReductionAct/downloads/Checklistl.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/TU8C-MUVS.
178 DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UNDERSTANDING
MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 163 (2000), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/primer.pdf.
179 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, §
6044 (2006).
180 Recipients living above 100% FPL may be required to pay up to
10% of covered services; recipients above 150% FPL may be charged up
176
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exception of true emergency services, 18 1 family-planning
services, and preventive services for kids) are provided for
recipients living above 100% FPL.182 States may also
permit health care providers to require payment from
recipients at the point of service before care is provided.
The statute established a cap on aggregate premium and
cost-sharing expenses, prohibiting them from exceeding 5%
of a family's monthly income, though enforcement of the cap
may be beyond the administrative capacity of many state
programs. Certain groups are protected from premiums
and cost sharing, including children below independently
specified
levels
of
poverty,
pregnant
women,
institutionalized adults, and those in hospice care. The door
remained open for states to impose harsher premiums or
cost sharing through section 1115 waivers.

2. Medicaid Wellness Program Waivers Priorto the A CA
In the years following passage of the DRA, DHHS
granted section 1115 waivers quite liberally for stateinitiated demonstration projects that incorporated personal
responsibility for wellness directly into the terms of
coverage.
Incentive-based programs in three statesFlorida, Idaho, and West Virginia-have garnered
particular attention from researchers. Florida's program
offered incentives for medical and lifestyle compliance.
Idaho and West Virginia went considerably further,
blurring the line between incentives and penalties by
initially reducing the quality of coverage for all beneficiaries
and then offering enhanced coverage as a reward for
wellness program participation and results.
In 2005, Florida obtained a waiverl 83 that shifted many
of the state's Medicaid recipients into private managed care
to 20%. Id. § 6041. Co-pays may also be charged for prescription drugs.
Id. § 6042.
181 A separate provision of the DRA specifically allows cost sharing
for non-emergency use of emergency room services. Id. § 6043.
182 Id. §§ 6041-43.
183 The initial waiver was granted for a five-year period. See CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID REFORM SECTION 1115
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plans and instituted the "Enhanced Benefit Reward$
Program," which was designed to encourage individuals to
improve their individual health behaviors.184 Recipients
complying with any of nineteen identified health behaviors
(ranging from getting a recommended pap smear or an
annual flu shot to participating in smoking cessation,
weight loss, or diabetes management programs), they
became eligible for vouchers ranging in value $7.50 to $25,
up to a total of $125 per year.185 Vouchers were redeemable
for medical goods not otherwise covered by Medicaid, like
The
over-the-counter medicines and Band-Aids.1 86
enhanced benefits can be placed into two categories: those
that are services provided by a doctor and "community
Particularly for interventional lifestyle
programs."187
programs, which the Florida Plan defined as "community
DEMONSTRATION, available at http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/Medicaid/
medicaidreform/waiver/pdfs/cms-special terms and conditions.pdf. It
was then extended for three additional years. See Letter from Cindy
Mann, Director, Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs., to Elizabeth
Dudek, Secretary, Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. (Dec. 15, 2011),
available at http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/Medicaid/medicaid-reform/pdfl
CMSApprovalULetter_12-15-2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
PK4G-SE64.
184 JESSICA GREENE, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC.,
MEDICAID EFFORTS TO INCENTIVIZE HEALTHY BEHAVIORS 4 (2007),
available
at
http://www.chcs.org/usrdoclMedicaidEffortsto_
IncentivizeHealthyBehaviors.pdf, PAT REDMOND ET AL., CENTER ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, CAN INCENTIVES FOR HEALTHY
BEHAVIOR IMPROVE HEALTH AND HOLD DOWN MEDICAID COSTS? 2
(2007), availableathttp://www.cbpp.org/files/6-1-07health.pdf.
185 GREENE, supra note 184, at 1; FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE
ADMIN.,
ENHANCED
BENEFITS
REWARD$
PROGRAM
(2011),
http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/medicaid/medicaidreformlenhabben/EBCod
esAsOf_7_26_2011.pdf [hereinafter ENHANCED BENEFITS].
186 REDMOND ET AL., supra note 184, at 2; GREENE, supra note 184,
at 7; ENHANCED BENEFITS, supra note 185.
187 Cf ENHANCED BENEFITS, supra note 185 (listing all Enhanced
Benefits as of July, 2011); Greene, supra note 184, at 4 (citing FLA.
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., ENHANCED BENEFITS ACCOUNTS
PROGRAM FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS [#11 4 (2006), available at
http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/Medicaid/medicaidreform/enhabben/ebacc
ounts-programfaq1_091206.pdf [hereinafter ENHANCED BENEFITS
FAQ]) (discussing community programs).
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programs" that have "defined goals and or milestones[,]
provide information, guidance, andlor assistance for specific
behaviors[,] and are accessible to the public"188-it
was
fairly onerous for recipients to obtain the vouchers. The
recipient was required to submit an "Enhanced Benefit
Universal Form" to the health plan. 189 The recipient was
required to get a health care provider or the sponsor of the
interventional program was required to specify the
beginning and end dates of the healthy behavior, "and sign
the form before forwarding it to the health plan." 90
An assessment of the Florida program published in 2013
found that virtually all of the rewards earned by
participants
in the
program were for receiving
recommended check-ups, with less than 1% of rewards
received for participation in lifestyle programs,191
representing two individuals (out of the more than 400,000
who were automatically enrolled in the program) who
earned credits for participating in a smoking-cessation
program (one of whom was not smoking six months after
initiating the program) and two individuals who earned
credits for participation in an exercise program.192 As of
this writing, the Florida Enhanced Benefits program is
being phased outl 9 3 while the state transitions to a new
demonstration project, as described below.
In 2007, Idaho received a waiver to develop two
incentive-based wellness programs, which the state referred
Greene, supra note 184, at 4 (citing ENHANCED BENEFITS FAQ,
supra note 185, at 4).
189 Lucinda Jesson, Weighing The Wellness Programs: The Legal
Implications Of Imposing PersonalResponsibility Obligations, 15 VA. J.
188

Soc. POI'Y & L. 217 (2008).
190 Id.

191 Blumenthal et al., supra note 14, at 499.
192 Id. at 498.
193 After July 1, 2014, recipients will no longer be able to earn
vouchers, and after June 30, 2015, recipients will not be able to redeem
vouchers. See Letter from Melanie Brown-Woofter, Chief, Bureau of Health
Sys. Dev., to Reform Health Plans (July 31, 2013), available at
http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/Medicaid/medicaidreform/enhabben/DHPRE_
EnhancedBenefitProgram PhaseOutNotice_1_7-31-13.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/WA6Q-P3CX.
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to as "Preventive Health Assistance" ("PHA") programs. 194
The first, called the "Behavioral PHA" targeted individuals
cessation.195
or smoking
management
for weight
Participants were rewarded for meeting with a health-care
provider to develop a weight-management or smokingcessation plan. Those who successfully quit smoking were
entitled to a second reward. Although a results-dependent
reward was initially planned for the weight-management
program as well, it was ultimately determined that such a
strategy put too much emphasis on losing weight, rather
Similar to the Florida
than on living healthfully. 196
program, rewards under this program took the form of
credits that could be used to pay for counseling, diet and
exercise programs, and nicotine replacement products. 97
An assessment published in 2013 found that fewer than
1500 (out of a pool of approximately 185,000 recipients)
participated in the first two years of the program.198 The
state did not assess the program's impact on actual
cessation and weight control. 9 9
Idaho's second program, called the "Wellness PHA," tied
rewards directly to cost-sharing requirements by offering
participants credits toward the payment of monthly
premiums as a reward for reporting for recommended wellchild visits. 200 An evaluation published in 2013 suggests
that the program significantly increased the proportion of
children who had received recommended well-child care.
194 GREENE, supra note 165; Preventative Health Assistance, IDAHO
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, http://healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/
Medical/Medicaid/PreventiveHealthAssistance/tabid/221/Default.aspx
(last visited Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Preventative Health Assistance],
archivedathttp://perma.cc/K7NJ-F2JU.
195 REDMOND ET AL., supra note 184, at 5; Preventive Health, supra
note 194.
196 GREENE, supra note 184.
197 REDMOND ET AL., supranote 184, at 5; Aimee Miles, Medicaid to
Offer Rewards for Healthy Behavior, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 11,
2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/april/08/medicaidincentives.aspx; GREENE, supra note 184, at 8.
198 Blumenthal et al., supra note 14, at 499.

199

Id.

200

GREENE, supra note 165.
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Consistent with other data regarding the impact of
incentives, the evaluation found that "[tihe largest increase
in adherence occurred with children requiring only one
annual visit" with gains declining for each additional
recommended visit per year. 20 1
Beginning in 2006, West Virginia took additional steps
to condition the terms of health-care coverage to medical
and lifestyle compliance. Abandoning its original benefits
package, West Virginia now has two tiers of Medicaid
benefits: a default package referred to as "Basic," and a
more robust plan referred to as "Enhanced."202 However,
the "Basic" plan offers fewer benefits than its
predecessor. 203
Recipients could access the Enhanced
package if they "sign and conform to an agreement with the
State that they will engage in certain behaviors." 204
Participating recipients agree to attend health improvement
programs as directed by their health care providers, report
on-time
for
recommended
check-ups
and
other
appointments, take prescribed medications as directed, use
the hospital emergency room only for emergencies, and "do
[their] best to stay healthy." 205
Some of the benefits included in the Enhanced Plan but
not the Basic plan simply amount to coverage of wellnessrelated services such as programs like weight management,
smoking
cessation,
diabetes
education,
nutritional

201
202

Blumenthal et al., supra note 14, at 499.
Sheryl Mitnick et al., Ethical Considerations for the Use of

PatientIncentives to Promote PersonalResponsibility for Health: West
Virginia Medicaid and Beyond, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS 3 (2010),
http://www.acponline.org/running-practice/ethics/issues/policy/personal
-incentives.pdf.
203 Thomas J. Parisi, The Onus Is on You: Wellness Plans and

Other Strategies Being Employed for Patients to Take Ownership of
Their Health, 13 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 243, 269-70 (2010). However,
some beneficiaries (those over sixty-five, disabled, or in foster care at
the time of the reforms) were allowed to keep the old benefits plan.

Robert Steinbrook, Imposing PersonalResponsibility for Health, 355
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 753, 754 (2006).
204 REDMOND ET AL., supra note 184, at 4.
205 Steinbrook, supra note 203, at 775.
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counseling, and substance-abuse treatment. 206
Other
benefits, however, are unrelated to wellness services and
offer significantly more comprehensive access to health
care. These include more comprehensive prescription-drug,
transportation, skilled nursing, and mental-health-care
benefits. 207 Notably, many services crucial to appropriate
management of chronic disease are covered only under the
Enhanced Plan, including patient-centered
diabetes
management and pulmonary rehabilitation services. 208 To
maintain these benefits, recipients are required to comply
with the Health Improvement Plan. Compliant recipients
are also rewarded with credits placed in a "Healthy
Rewards Account," which can be used to purchase services
not otherwise covered by Medicaid, such as gym
memberships and healthy foods. 209
An assessment published in 2013 found that only 10% of
eligible adults have enrolled in the Enhanced Plan, 210
meaning that the vast majority were simply downgraded
into less comprehensive health-care coverage. Those who
are enrolled in the Enhanced Plan have more office visits
and are more likely to take prescribed medications than
those who did not enroll. 211
3. MedicaidIncentives for the Prevention of Chronic
Disease Grant Program
New federal grants established under the ACA are
providing further support for states to experiment with
206 Mitnick et al., supranote 202, at 3; Steinbrook, supra note 203.
207 REDMOND ET AL., supra note 184, at 4; DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN RES., CHAPTER 527 COVERED SERVICES, LIMITATIONS, AND
EXCLUSIONS FOR MOUNTAIN HEALTH CHOICES 12-43 (2009) [hereinafter
CHAPTER 5271, available at http://www.dhhr.wv.gov/bms/Documents/
bmsmanualsChapter_527MountainHealthChoices.pdf
at
12-43
(describing terms of coverage under the Basic and Enhanced Plans).
208 CHAPTER 527, supra note 207, at 27-43 (describing several
preventive and disease management benefits available only under the
Enhanced Plan).
209 Robert Steinbrook, supra note 203, at 754.
210 Blumenthal et al., supranote 14, at 500.
211

Id.
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incentive-based wellness programs aimed at tobacco
cessation and weight, cholesterol, and blood-pressure
management, and diabetes prevention and management. 212
The statutory provision specifies that grants should be
awarded to states "to carry out initiatives to provide
incentives to Medicaid beneficiaries who-(i) successfully
participate in a [wellness program]; and (ii) upon
completion of such participation, demonstrate changes in
health risk and outcomes, including the adoption and
maintenance of healthy behaviors by meeting specific
targets." 213 This language clearly contemplates outcomebased health-contingent programs. Furthermore, the
statute mandates that recipient states "validate changes in
health risk and outcomes with clinical data, including the
adoption and maintenance of health behaviors by such
beneficiaries" and "to the extent practicable, establish
standards and health status targets for Medicaid
beneficiaries participating in the program and measure the
degree to which such standards and targets are met."2 14 At
least one commentator expressed concern that "[w]hat
counts as a permissible incentive is not specified in the Act,"
leaving the door open for states to "try to use more coercive
incentives than would be permitted in private health plans"
in response to the statutory requirement that the programs
"'validate' beneficiary progress." 215
In 2011, DHHS created the Medicaid Incentives for the
Prevention of Chronic Disease ("MIPCD") grant program to
provide states with a total of $85 million over five years to
"test the effectiveness of providing incentives directly to
Medicaid beneficiaries . . . who participate in the MIPCD

prevention programs, and change their health risks and

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119, 562, § 4108(a)(3) (2010).
213 Id. § 4801(a)(1)(A).
214 Id. § 4108(c).
212

Wendy Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion:
The Role of Insurancein Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and
215

Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 287 (2012).

2014

ACA's PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR WELLNESS REFORMS

703

outcomes by adopting healthy behaviors." 216
The ten programs receiving funding feature a strong
emphasis on the responsibility of the state to provide
coverage of wellness-related services (such as smoking
cessation or weight management programs). For example,
Wisconsin's program features provision of tobacco-cessation
counseling and education for health care providers
regarding
the
resources
available
to
Medicaid
beneficiaries. 217 New Hampshire's program randomizes
participants into programs that cover gym membership,
gym membership plus sessions with a personal fitness
trainer, Weight WatchersTM, or Weight WatchersTM plus
gym membership and personal trainer sessions. 218
Most of the programs provide small financial incentives
unrelated to the terms of coverage for participation only. 2 19
One state, Texas, provides a larger incentive in the form of
a flexible spending account. 220 All of the programs offer
216 See MIPCD: The States Awarded, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/MIPCDfMIPCDThe-States-Awarded.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014), archived at
http://perma.ccN523-R2F4.
217 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MIPCD STATE
SUMMARY: WISCONSIN [hereinafter MIPCD WISCONSIN], available at
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/MIPCD-WI.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/CG4D-U2K7.
218 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MIPCD STATE
SUMMARY: NEW HAMPSHIRE [hereinafter MIPCD NEW HAMPSHIRE],
available at http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/MIPCD-NH.pdf, archived
athttp://perma.cc/3M53-ZQ55.
219 For example, California's program provides $20 to reward
Medicaid beneficiaries who call a helpline, complete the intake protocol,
and participate in counseling sessions.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., MIPCD STATE SUMMARY: CALIFORNIA, available at
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/MIPCD-CA.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/6J4F-887W;Hawaii's program offers $25 to beneficiaries
who attend the first session of a smoking cessation, behavioral health
counseling, or diabetes education program. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., MIPCD STATE SUMMARY: HAWAII, available at
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/MIPCD-HI.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/KJ48-Y5Y6.
220 MIPCDState Summary. Texas, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., available at http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/MIPCD-TX.pdf,
archivedat http://perma.cc/5ZA4-SGN2.
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participation-dependent incentives, while six of the ten
programs offer some form of results-based incentive. 22 1 Of
those six, only three are for an outcome other than smoking
cessation, 222 and only two appear to involve clinical
measurement (as opposed to self-report) as a means for
validating health outcomes.223]

Programs in Wisconsin, New Hampshire, and Connecticut offer
rewards for actual smoking cessation. MIPCD WISCONSIN, supra note
218; MIPCD NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 218; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., MIPCD STATE SUMMARY: CONNECTICUT [hereinafter
MIPCD CONNECTICUT], available at http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/
MIPCD-CT.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TA57-RU8Q. New York's
program offers rewards for smoking cessation and for specified outcomes
with regard to blood pressure, weight, and glycated hemoglobin (a
CTRS. FOR
marker indicative of diabetes disease management).
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MIPCD STATE SUMMARY: NEW YORK
at
available
YORK],
NEW
MIPCD
[hereinafter
at
archived
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/MIPCD-NY.pdf,
Nevada's program, which is aimed at
http://perma.cc/Z5V6-9Q6S.
reducing weight, cholesterol, and blood pressure and at managing and
preventing diabetes offers incentives for achievement of unspecified
"improved health outcomes." CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MIPCD STATE SUMMARY: NEVADA [hereinafter MIPCD NEVADA],
available at http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x[MIPCD-NV.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/QZ5B-6N7Z. Minnesota's program, which is aimed at
weight loss, offers rewards for unspecified "goal attainment and goal
maintenance." CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MIPCD STATE
SUMMARY: MINNESOTA [hereinafter MIPCD MINNESOTA], available at
at
archived
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/MIPCD-MN.pdf,
http://perma.cc/662J-8E83.
222 MIPCD WISCONSIN, supra note 217; MIPCD NEW HAMPSHIRE,
supra note 218; MIPCD CONNECTICUT, supra note 221; MIPCD NEW
YORK, supra note 221; MIPCD NEVADA, supra note 221; MIPCD
Minnesota, supra note 221.
223 Connecticut's program offers a $15 reward for each negative
result on a breathalyzer test that detects smoking in the previous fortyNew York's
eight hours. MIPCD CONNECTICUT, supra note 221.
decreased
a
maintaining
or
"decreasing
for
rewards
offers
program
clinically
another
or
achieving
10mmHg
by
pressure
blood
systolic
percent
by
0.6
hemoglobin]
[glycated
for
"decreasing
target;"
appropriate
or
"losing
or
for
less;"
or
percent
8.0
of
a
level
or maintaining
221.
note
supra
YORK,
NEW
MIPCD
weight."
maintaining a reduced
221
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4. Post-ACA Medicaid Waiver Decisions
The Supreme Court's 2012 decision making the Medicaid
expansion optional for stateS224 has given states even more
bargaining power in seeking flexibility from CMS through
waivers. 225 Some of these waiver requests include the use of
incentive-based wellness programs.
In 2013, CMS approved a new section 1115 waiver to
allow Florida to fully privatize its Medicaid program,
shifting nearly all of the state's Medicaid recipients into
managed care plans operated by private insurance
companies. 226 Information provided by the state regarding
this new demonstration project specifies that the managed
care plans "will also establish programs to encourage and
reward healthy behaviors" for smoking cessation, weight
loss and alcohol or substance abuse recovery. 227
As part of a compromise reached in the Iowa state
legislature over whether to accept the ACA's Medicaid
expansion, the state sought section 1115 waivers to allow it
to experiment with two new ways of covering adults aged
nineteen through 64,228 many of whom are newly eligible for
Medicaid under the ACA expansion. The state's proposal
Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
ROBERT ALT &NATHANIEL STEWART, BUCKEYE INSTITUTE FOR
PUB. POLICY SOLUTIONS, MEDICAID WAIVERS ARE TEMPORARY,
EXPANSION
IS
FOREVER
(2013),
available
at
https://www.mackinac.org/archives/2013/s2o13-06.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/8CXF-FPGF.
226 JOAN ACKLER & JACK HOADLEY, JESSE BALL DUPONT FUND,
MEDICAID MANAGED
CARE IN FLORIDA (2013), available at
http://www.dupontfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/medicaid-brieffall-2103.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/C23K-EGAJ.
227 FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN.,
FLORIDA MANAGED
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 9 (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/statewide_mc/pdf/mma/Overview
of_ManagedMedical Assistance-program_02-12-2013.pdf,
archived at
http://perma.cc/M2GJ-YNEV.
228 Certain individuals-those with disabling mental
disorders,
chronic substance abuse disorders, serious and complex medical
conditions, physical, intellectual or developmental disability-would be
exempt from both plans and would be enrolled in a traditional Medicaid
plan.
224

225

INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW

706

Vol. 11:2

for two distinct plans was approved by CMS in December
2013 (along with a similar proposal submitted by Michigan).
Under Iowa's "Marketplace Choice Plan," adults living at
between 101% and 133% FPL are be enrolled in commercial
health plans available through the state's health insurance
Exchange (purchased with federal funds), rather than being
enrolled in the public Medicaid program. 229 The state's
second waiver application for the "Iowa Wellness Plan,"230
under which adults between 50% and 100% FPL will be
charged monthly premiums amounting to as much as 5% of
their income, with a "waiver" available as a reward for
completion of wellness activities was also approved. The
premiums will not be charged to any beneficiaries during
the first year, but any beneficiary who has not completed a
health risk assessment and clinical exam by the end of 2014
will be charged monthly premiums beginning in 2015. After
2014, additional "wellness activities" will be required to
avoid monthly premiums. As of this writing, a third waiver
request tied to the Medicaid expansion and incorporating
personal responsibility for wellness incentives, submitted by
Pennsylvania, was still pending review.
Other states have indicated interest in similar
approaches and are certainly taking notice of recent CMS
decisions. 231 For example, the governor of Idaho has
indicated that he would only consider expanding Medicaid
229

PLAN

IOWA DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., IOWA MARKETPLACE CHOICE
available at
1115 WAIVER APPLICATION (Aug. 2013),

http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/uploads/IAMktplaceChoicelll5Final.pdf
,archived at http://perma.cc/W7GF-CZ6G.
230 IOWA DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., IOWA WELLNESS PLAN 1115
WAIVER APPLICATION (2013), available at http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/
uploads/IAWellnessPlan1115_Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
K4S6-TP5Z.

See, e.g., Kevin Miller, Senator Rethinks Bill to Deny Health
Care to Smokers, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2011, 7:58 PM),
231

http://bangordailynews.com/2011/03/0 1/health/senator-rethinks-bill(reporting that Senator Tom
to- deny-health-care-to-smokers/
Saviello introduced a bill to prohibit smokers from receiving Maine
health care benefits in order to start a dialogue about the cost
at
archived
taxpayers),
Maine
on
place
smokers
http://perma.cc/33UL-FDQ9.
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eligibility if there were some provision for "requir[ing] more
personal responsibility and better health outcomes." The
Governor's statements indicate that he is clearly
contemplating a punitive approach: "If you're smoking, you
gotta quit smoking .. . and if you don't quit smoking, some
part of the benefit, or all of it, goes away. If you've got a
history of diabetes in your family, and you're told to change
a certain lifestyle, and you don't do it, then you don't get
[benefits] anymore." 232 CMS approval of the Iowa and
Michigan plans might be taken as evidence that the agency
is quite comfortable with incentive-based wellness programs
that make access to health care contingent upon healthy
behavior. An argument could perhaps even be made that
while DHHS and other implementing agencies have taken a
stance protective of individuals who are privately insured,
they have failed to extend the same protection to those poor
enough to qualify for Medicaid.
It seems more likely,
however, that the CMS approvals are simply the product of
state's assuming a superior negotiating position as a result
of the Supreme Court's 2012 decision. Expanding Medicaid
eligibility in Iowa and Michigan while allowing the
imposition of premiums and cost-sharing terms that
penalize individuals for non-compliance with wellness goals
might easily be weighed as a better alternative to having
the state refuse the expansion. 233 In any case, rigorous
evaluation of these demonstration projects could provide
useful information about the impact of wellness incentives
for Medicaid recipients.
232 Audrey Dutton, Idaho Gov. Otter Wants More Personal
Accountability in Medicaid, IDAHO STATESMAN (May 30, 2013)
http://www.idahostatesman.com/2013/05/30/2595854/carrots-and-sticksfor-medicaid.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/B4SS-BD4C.
233 See, e.g., Tim Martin, Michigan House Repubhlicans Introduce
Broad Medicaid Plan with
ime Limits, Expanded Coverage,

MLIVE.COM (May 9, 2013, 7:49 PM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/

index. ssf/2013/05/michigan-house-republicans_det.html (reporting that
Michigan's legislature proposed expanding the population of those
eligible for Medicaid in exchange for implementing personal
responsibility measures that would affect the entire Medicaid
population), archived at http://perma.cc/68YP-2H6V.
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III. CONCLUSION
Recent agency actions implementing a c lection of ACA
reforms designed to promote personal responsibility for
wellness indicate appropriate skepticism toward an
approach that places the onus on individuals to change their
behavior, without necessarily making it more feasible for
them to do so. The agency-commissioned RAND Report
provides a much-needed antidote to hyperbolic wellness
industry claims regarding the potential public-health
benefits and cost savings of incentive-based programs. It
expertise-driven
for
the foundation
also provides
provisions.
wellness
of
ACA
administrative implementation
The 2013 Final Rule on group-based wellness programs
sharply curtails the most punitive approaches and should
offer greater protection than its predecessor against the use
of wellness incentives as a pretext for shifting health-care
costs to individuals who are perceived as unhealthy. The
individual market demonstration project and small business
grant program are less far along in their implementation,
but they create promising opportunities for HHS to continue
to emphasize the importance of insurer and employer
responsibility interventions such as enhanced coverage for
and services and worksite
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encouraging that state programs receiving funds under the
Medicaid wellness incentives grant program largely
emphasize participation-only incentives, with minimal
representation of biomarker-based rewards and no
measures that tie the terms of coverage directly to wellness
program engagement. The tilt of these funded programs
toward payer responsibility may provide a clue as to the
agency's likely response to pending waiver requests that
would take a more punitive approach. Altogether, agency
implementation of these provisions represents an important
step in the right direction. But continued vigilance is
necessary to ensure that third-party payers do not use
wellness reforms to undermine the ACA's goals with respect
to health care access and disease prevention.
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Beyond curtailing undesirable practices (from a public
health standpoint) by third-party payers, the question
remains whether public-health advocates might be able to
enlist those payers in their efforts to tackle some of the most
powerful, upstream drivers of chronic diseases like diabetes
and heart disease. I have argued elsewhere that we are
nearing a political crossroads in the effort to prevent
obesity-related disease. 234
Powerful industries are
expending considerable resources to sway policymakers at
every level of government away from interventions aimed at
creating work, school, and marketplace environments that
are more conducive to healthy living.
Personalresponsibility measures are generally more politically
palatable and fiscally conservative and they have the
backing of the wellness industry, which stands to profit
from their implementation. Ironically, local governmentswho, unlike states and the federal government, do not play
a significant role in paying health-care costs-have been
among the most innovative pioneers in this effort. 235 The
federal government, which funds the Medicare program in
its entirety, has perhaps the greatest financial stake in
chronic-disease prevention, but federal action is stymied by
a dysfunctional legislature. State legislatures are poised to
become a key battleground, but many of them are blocking
local efforts through preemption legislation rather than
implementing meaningful reforms. 236
A powerful new
ally-in the form of private insurers and state-government
payers--could provide leverage for public health advocates
at a crucial time.
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